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Abstract
This paper is motivated by the recent ﬁnancial crisis and addresses whether a too low for
too long interest rate policy may generate a boom-bust cycle. We suggest a model in which
a microfounded shadow banking sector is included in an otherwise state-of-the-art DSGE model.
When faced with perverse incentives, ﬁnancial intermediaries within the shadow banking sector can
divert a fraction of stockholders' proﬁts for their own beneﬁts and extend credit at a discounted
rate. The model predicts that long periods of accommodative monetary policy do create the
preconditions for, but do not cause per se, a boom-bust cycle. Rather, it is the combination of
a persistent monetary ease with microeconomic distortions in the ﬁnancial system that causes a
boom-bust.
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1 Introduction
The Fed funds rate: too low for too long? Some observers have recently criticized the Fed for helping
fuel the credit/house-price boom and thereby the subprime crisis by keeping interest rates too low for
too long. If correct, this criticism would have important implications for the future conduct of monetary
policy. Unfortunately, conventional dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models are not
well suited to address this issue because of their rather simple modelling structure of the ﬁnancial
system and of its relation with the real economy. In particular, although ﬁnancial intermediaries
have been at the center of the subprime crisis, they have played so far a relatively passive role in
macroeconomic models.
This article aims to determine whether long periods of loose monetary policy may have a part to play
in generating a boom-bust cycle. We do so by building a DSGE model with a two-sector ﬁnancial
system  a retail banking sector and a shadow banking sector in which there may exist optimism and
perverse incentives. Such a model, in which we explicitly model the behavior of ﬁnancial intermediaries
within the shadow banking system, aims at providing further insights into the transmission of monetary
policy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the two strands of literature on which our
work builds, one on the causes of the subprime crisis and one on the role of the ﬁnancial sector in
DSGE models. Section 3 provides a general descriptive overview of our model. Section 4 describes the
ﬁnancial system and, in particular, the modelling of the shadow banking system based on microeco-
nomic foundations. Section 5 details the calibration of the model and presents the impulse responses
in both a) a one-period expansionary monetary policy shock and b) a persistently low interest rate
scenario. Section 6 concludes.1
The central result of the paper is that a too low for too long interest rate policy does create the
preconditions for, but does not cause per se, a boom-bust cycle. In fact, ﬂuctuations in both real and
ﬁnancial variables are markedly ampliﬁed only when a persistently accommodative monetary policy
environment is coupled with perverse incentives in the ﬁnancial sector.
2 Motivation
2.1 The subprime crisis
Following the 2007 collapse of the U.S. subprime mortgage market and the resulting global ﬁnancial
and economic crisis, several authors have discussed the causes and consequences of the house price
bubble and the boom-bust cycle. These analyses, either coming from the academia (e.g., Borio, 2008
and Blanchard, 2009) or from policy-makers (e.g., Trichet, 2009, Bean et al., 2010 and Bernanke,
2010), have overall concluded that the seeds of the crisis lay in a combination of both micro and macro
factors.2
1 Appendix A presents the complete model, while technical details are described in appendices B, C and D.
2 See Borio (2008), Brunnermeier (2009) and FED (2009) for a chronology of the events relating to the subprime
crises.
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Microeconomic factors are mostly related to recent innovations in ﬁnancial instruments, institutions
and markets. A non-exhaustive list of these factors includes: the reduced incentives for lenders to
properly screen and monitor borrowers due to pay packages encouraging the pursuit of short-term
returns; the under-estimation of the true risk of complex (and often not transparent) structured ﬁnan-
cial products arising from the replacement of sound risk management practices with mathematical and
statistical models of risk; the distorted incentives faced by ratings agencies; the moral hazard behavior
of ﬁnancial institutions considered too big or too important to fail; and, additionally, an inadequate
regulation and supervision of individual ﬁnancial institutions and markets and of the ﬁnancial system
as a whole.
Potential macroeconomic factors include a protracted period of very low (and in some cases negative)
real interest rates and plentiful liquidity; large international payments imbalances resulting from a
savings glut in surplus countries; and the benign macroeconomic environment at the beginning of
the 21st century as side eﬀect of the Great Moderation.
Evidence for assigning a central role, as cause of the subprime crisis, to excessively loose monetary
policy is, nevertheless, mixed. To date, the 2010 Jackson Hole Symposium provides the most re-
cent debate on this issue. On the one hand, Bean et al. (2010) argue that low policy rates played
only a modest direct role. As they state, although monetary policy may have played a role in the
credit/house-price boom that preceded the crisis, it is rather more Rosencrantz than Hamlet. On the
other hand, Taylor (2010) disagrees that the role of monetary policy was only a modest one without
implications for future policy.
In this paper we do not attempt to explicitly model the subprime crisis. First, it is unlikely that any
of the aforementioned factors in isolation could explain the crisis. Second, it would be too complex to
comprise all of them in a DSGE model. Nevertheless, we do try to capture some micro factors (related
in particular with the behavior of ﬁnancial intermediaries) relevant to analyzing whether the Fed's
policy to keep interest rates low for a prolonged period may have played a key role for the run-up of
the crisis. To explore this hypothesis, we rely on a model in which the ﬁnancial sector, rather than
being passive, plays a central role in driving the boom-bust cycle.
2.2 Financial system in DSGE models
The DSGE model, currently the state-of-the-art macroeconomic model, results from a fusion of the
Real Business Cycle models of the 1980s with the New Keynesian sticky-price models of the early
1990s. In its primordial version, this model incorporated no role for credit and ﬁnancial factors at
all. Works that followed have continued to assume frictionless ﬁnancial markets so that ﬁnancial
intermediaries played a passive role, despite of the increasing awareness about their importance in
aﬀecting the performance of the economy, including though the transmission of monetary policy. For
example, in the DSGE models currently used for monetary policy analysis at the main central banks
 e.g., the SIGMA model at the FED (Erceg et al., 2006), the Smets and Wouters model at the ECB
(Smets and Wouters, 2003) and the Bank of England's Quarterly Model (Harrison et al., 2005)  the
ﬁnancial sector hardly plays a prominent role.
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A ﬁrst attempt to introduce a ﬁnancial sector in a New Keynesian DSGE framework has been made
by Bernanke et al. (1999). In their model, the ﬁnancial sector is limited to a banking sector that
ampliﬁes the eﬀects of the shocks via the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect. More recently, some authors have
enhanced the structure and role of the ﬁnancial sector in DSGE models. Iacoviello (2005) extends the
Bernanke et al. (1999) model by introducing collateral constraints for ﬁrms, as in Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997). Christiano et al. (2003, 2008, 2010) and Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) consider a perfectly
competitive banking sector that oﬀers agents a variety of ﬁnancial assets with diﬀerent returns, while
Kobayashi (2008) and Gerali et al. (2010) consider imperfect competition in the banking sector so as to
model the setting of interest rates by banks. Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) also allow for a time-varying
spread between deposits and lending rates. Finally, a number of papers (see, for instance, Van den
Heuvel, 2008, Gertler and Karadi, 2009, de Walque et al., 2010 and Meh and Moran, 2010) study the
role of bank capital in the transmission of macroeconomic shocks.3,4
While most of the literature focuses on ﬁnancial frictions that arise from the behavior of borrowers, the
subprime crisis has highlighted the need to analyze the behavior of ﬁnancial intermediaries themselves.
In this paper we take a step toward determining whether the ﬁnancial sector plays an active role in the
boom-bust cycle. We do so by augmenting the Christiano et al. (2010) model with a shadow banking
system. Our microfounded ﬁnancial system is thus composed of two diﬀerent ﬁnancial intermediaries
(retail and investment banks) that intermediate funds from households (lenders) to two groups of
entrepreneurs (borrowers).
Following the Bernanke et al. (1999) framework, in the retail banking sector there is an agency / infor-
mation problem between borrowers and lenders. Information is asymmetric, in that the entrepreneur's
realized return may be observed at no cost only by the entrepreneur, while it can be observed by the
retail bank only after paying a monitoring cost. Thus, the model is of the costly state veriﬁcation type.
In the shadow banking sector we introduce an agency / money problem, in that the investment bank
manager may pursue his own private objectives, which need not coincide with those of the stockholders.
This problem arises because the manager faces perverse incentives  in the form of side payments  to
boost his private revenue at the expense of stockholders' proﬁts, i.e. the bank manager can divert a
fraction of stockholders' proﬁts for his own beneﬁt.
We then use the model to address the following questions:
1. How do perverse incentives in the ﬁnancial sector aﬀect the transmission of monetary policy
shocks through the economy? How diﬀerent are our ﬁndings from those of a workhorse DSGE
model?
2. Does a too low for too long interest rate policy cause a boom-bust cycle?
3. What are the eﬀects of perverse incentives in the ﬁnancial sector when coupled with a persistently
low interest rate environment?
3 Drumond (2009) provides an exhaustive survey on the theoretical literature on the bank capital channel of propa-
gation of exogenous shocks as well as on the regulatory framework of capital requirements under the Basel Accords.
4 This brief review only focuses on DSGE models and, in view of the growth of this literature, does not aim to be
exhaustive.
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3 An overview of the model
The core of our framework is a simpliﬁed version of the Financial Accelerator Model described in Chris-
tiano et al. (2010), hereafter CMR.5 It essentially corresponds to the models in Smets and Wouters
(2003) and Christiano et al. (2005) enlarged with the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism developed by
Bernanke et al. (1999). To this we add a shadow banking system that intermediates funds between
households and an additional set of entrepreneurs. The model is thus composed of government, house-
holds, ﬁrms, capital producers, entrepreneurs, and banks. Figure 1 sketches the structure of the model.
Agents drawn in black are those already present in the CMR model, while the new agents are drawn
in blue.
Government expenditures represent a constant fraction of ﬁnal output and are ﬁnanced by lump-sum
taxes imposed to the households. The central bank sets the nominal interest rate.
Households consume, save and supply labor services monopolistically. Two types of ﬁnancial instru-
ments, oﬀered by banks, are available to households: time deposits and corporate bonds. To keep this
part of the model as simple as possible, we assume that the rate of return is the same for both ﬁnancial
instruments, so households are indiﬀerent between holding deposits or bonds.
On the production side, monopolistically competitive intermediate-good ﬁrms use labor (supplied by
households) and capital (rented from entrepreneurs) to produce a continuum of diﬀerentiated inter-
mediate goods. Perfectly competitive ﬁnal-good ﬁrms buy intermediate goods and produce the ﬁnal
output, which is then converted into consumption, investment and government goods.
Capital producers combine investment goods with undepreciated capital purchased from entrepreneurs
to produce new capital, which is then sold back to entrepreneurs.
Capital services are supplied by entrepreneurs, who own the stock of physical capital and choose how
intensively to use it. Entrepreneurs purchase capital using their own resources  net worth, or equity,
resulting from net proceeds of their activities from one period to the next  as well as external ﬁnance.
In fact, entrepreneurs' net worth is not enough to ﬁnance the full amount of capital they acquire, so
they ﬁnance a part of their capital expenditures either by issuing bonds or by means of bank loans.
The setting up of the shadow banking system is paralleled by the division of the entrepreneurial sector
into two groups: the riskier entrepreneurs and the safer entrepreneurs, who have access to two diﬀerent
sources of external funding.6 We assume that the riskier entrepreneurs obtain ﬁnancing via retail bank
loans, while the safer entrepreneurs issue bonds resorting to investment banks.7 In particular, we
5 The simpliﬁed version excludes long-run growth, the ﬁxed cost in the production function and distortionary taxes
on capital and labor income and on household consumption. While not changing the model's dynamic responses to
monetary policy shocks, these simpliﬁcations reduce its complexity.
6 A number of papers (see, among many others, Diamond, 1991, Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994, Holmstrom and
Tirole, 1997, Berlin and Loeys, 1988, Bolton and Freixas, 2000, 2006, Repullo and Suarez, 2000, Chakraborty and Ray,
2007, Hale, 2007 and Gerber, 2008) characterize equilibria when bank lending and direct ﬁnancing through securities
issues are both present. Usually, in equilibrium, ﬁrms are segmented by risk classes in their choice of funding, with safer
ﬁrms choosing bond ﬁnancing and riskier ﬁrms preferring bank loans.
7 Typically, a ﬁrm going public hires an investment bank to sell its securities. The investment bank (the underwriter)
acts as an intermediary between the issuing ﬁrm and the ultimate investors. The most common type of underwriting
arrangement is the ﬁrm commitment underwriting, according to which the underwriter buys the entire stock of bonds
from the ﬁrm and resells it to investors at a higher price (i.e., at a lower interest rate). This spread represents the
investment bank's proﬁts. See Ellis et al. (2000) for an in-depth analysis of the underwriting process.
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consider the entrepreneurs of the CMR model as riskier because they may default (since they face
an idiosyncratic productivity shock), while we consider the additional set of entrepreneurs as safer
because we assume that they always have enough wealth to repay their debt and thus never default.
Accordingly, we calibrate the model so as to guarantee that, in equilibrium, safer entrepreneurs ﬁnance
themselves at a lower interest rate than riskier entrepreneurs.
Lending to riskier entrepreneurs involves an agency/information problem, because they costlessly ob-
serve their idiosyncratic shocks, whereas the retail bank must pay a monitoring cost to observe those
shocks. The optimal lending contract is of the costly state veriﬁcation type. In particular, a standard
debt contract is set up specifying a loan amount and an interest rate to pay whenever the entrepreneur
is solvent. If the entrepreneur cannot pay the required interest because of an unfavorable realization of
his productivity shock, he goes into bankruptcy and turns over his remaining equity to the retail bank,
after being monitored. The rate of return paid by solvent entrepreneurs must thus be high enough to
cover the cost of funds to the bank, as well as the monitoring costs net of the resources that the bank
can recover from bankrupt entrepreneurs (for further details see Bernanke et al., 1999).
The investment banking sector is the core part of our shadow banking system.8 We assume that the
bond market is populated by a continuum of monopolistic competitive investment banks, who set the
coupon rate on bonds in order to maximize proﬁts, which are then rebated to the stockholders, i.e. to
the households.9 Within each investment bank, the agent that makes the decision is the investment
bank manager, whom we call henceforth the underwriter.
Two distinct mechanisms  optimism and perverse incentives  are at work in the investment banking
sector. First, we consider that an optimistic underwriter is willing to underwrite bonds at a lower
 relatively to its normal value  coupon interest rate.10 We assume that the underwriter turns
out to be optimistic when the entrepreneur pledges more collateral and, accordingly, we model under-
writer's optimism as a positive function of the entrepreneur's net worth. An unexpected increase of
the entrepreneur's net worth  as a result of a monetary easing or a favorable productivity shock 
triggers optimism and may result in a lower bond coupon interest rate. Second, we introduce perverse
incentives by assuming that the safer entrepreneur oﬀers side payments to the underwriter in order to
borrow at a more favorable interest rate. In exchange of those side payments, an optimistic underwriter
may de facto facilitate the extension of credit by setting a discounted  relatively to the normal
 bond coupon rate. Deﬁning how much the coupon rate deviates from the normal rate depends
upon the underwriter's utility function, in which the trade-oﬀ between maximizing his private revenue
and the investment bank's proﬁts (hence, the stockholders' proﬁts) is explicitly modeled. An agency
conﬂict between investment bank managers and stockholders arises because side payments represent a
8 The expression shadow banking system has been suggested originally by Paul McCulley of PIMCO at the 2007
Jackson Hole conference, where he deﬁned it as the whole alphabet soup of levered up non-bank investment conduits,
vehicles, and structures (McCulley, 2007, pag. 2). See Pozsar et al. (2010) for a comprehensive and up-to-date
description of the shadow banking system.
9 The empirical evidence on the U.S. market of bond underwriting suggests an oligopolistic market structure. For
example, Fang (2005) shows that the largest ﬁve investment banks underwrite more than 60% of all deals, and the largest
ﬁfteen banks account for roughly 95% of all deals.
10 There is considerable evidence that economic agents may be too optimistic. See De Bondt and Thaler (1994) for
an exhaustive survey on behavioral ﬁnance and Puri and Robinson (2007) for an empirical analysis on how optimism
aﬀects economic decisions.
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compensation for the underwriter to the sacriﬁce of stockholders' proﬁtability.11
Having brieﬂy presented the main features of our model, in the next section we describe the ﬁnancial
system, with particular emphasis on the shadow banking system. The rest of the model is standard in
the literature and is set out in appendix A.
Figure 1: Structure of the model
4 The ﬁnancial system
We assume that riskier entrepreneurs represent a fraction η of the total population of entrepreneurs,
while safer entrepreneurs represent the remaining fraction, 1 − η. In what follows, the superscripts
H and H, r (L and L, l) refer to variables associated with the riskier (safer) entrepreneurs.
4.1 Riskier entrepreneurs and retail banks
Riskier entrepreneurs own a share of the economy's stock of physical capital. Entrepreneurs' net
worth is enough to ﬁnance only a part of their holdings of physical capital, the rest being ﬁnanced
by loans from a representative retail bank. Entrepreneurial loans are risky because the returns on
11 The agency conﬂict between managers and stockholders is a central theme in the corporate-ﬁnance literature (see
Stein, 2003, for a survey). The manager-stockholder agency conﬂict arises because the managers may pursue their
own private objectives rather than those of outside stockholders. Studies on conﬂicts of interest in investment banking
industry include, among others, Michaely and Womack (1999) and Mehran and Stulz (2007).
7
their investments are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. In particular, entrepreneurs who suﬀer a large
unfavorable shock and who therefore cannot pay the required interest, go bankrupt. Financial frictions
arise because the idiosyncratic shock is observed by the entrepreneurs at no cost, and by the bank
only if it incurs in a ﬁxed monitoring cost. To mitigate costs stemming from this source of asymmetric
information, entrepreneurs and bank sign a standard debt contract, according to which the entrepreneur
commits to pay back the loan principal and a non-default interest rate, unless he declares default. In
case of default, the bank conducts a veriﬁcation of the residual value of the entrepreneur's assets and
takes in all of the entrepreneur's net worth, net of monitoring costs.
The debt contracts extended by the bank to entrepreneurs are ﬁnanced by bank's issuance of time
deposits to households. Although individual entrepreneurs are risky, the bank itself is not: by lending
to a large number of entrepreneurs, the bank can diversify the idiosyncratic risk and thus can guarantee
a safe return on households' deposits. Nevertheless, ﬁnancial frictions  reﬂecting the costly state
veriﬁcation problem between entrepreneurs and the bank  imply that bank hedges against credit risk
by charging a premium over the rate at which it can borrow from households.
In particular, as shown by Bernanke et al. (1999), the ﬁrst order conditions of the contracting problem
yield the following relationship linking the expected return on capital (Rk,Ht+1 ) relative to the risk-free
interest rate (Ret+1) and the entrepreneur's leverage ratio (
Q
k¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1
NH,rt+1
):
Et
(
1 +Rk,Ht+1
)
1 +Ret+1
= Ψ
(
Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1
NH,rt+1
)
, (1)
where Qk¯′,t, K¯
H,r
t+1 andN
H,r
t+1 denote, respectively, the price of capital, the entrepreneur's stock of capital
and the entrepreneur's net worth and the function Ψ is such that Ψ
′
> 0 for NH,rt+1 < Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1 . The
ratio
Et(1+Rk,Ht+1 )
1+Ret+1
, which Bernanke et al. (1999) interpreted as the external ﬁnance premium faced by
the entrepreneur, depends positively on the entrepreneur's leverage ratio. Intuitively, all else equal,
higher leverage means higher exposure, implying a higher probability of default, hence a higher credit
risk, which the bank translates into a higher required return on lending.
The cost of borrowing ﬂuctuates endogenously with the cycle due to two general equilibrium mecha-
nisms.
The ﬁrst one is the Bernanke et al. (1999) ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect, whereby induced changes
in the asset price alter the value of the collateral that the entrepreneur can pledge and, hence, the
contractual loan rate. Speciﬁcally, a positive shock to the asset price  as a result of a monetary
easing or a favorable shock to productivity  increases the entrepreneur's net worth and decreases the
external ﬁnance premium, which in turn stimulates the demand for investment. The increase in net
worth also reduces the expected default probability and allows the entrepreneur to take on more debt
and to further expand investment. An accelerator eﬀect arises, since the investment boom raises the
asset price, further pushing up the entrepreneur's net worth and investment.
The second mechanism  which CMR refer to as the Fisher deﬂation eﬀect  is absent in Bernanke
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et al. (1999) and works through a debt-deﬂation eﬀect.12 This eﬀect arises because of the assumption
that the return received by households on time deposits is nominally non-state contingent, while
loans to entrepreneurs are state-contingent. Therefore, unexpected movements in the price level alter
the ex-post real burden of entrepreneurial debt and, hence, the entrepreneur's net worth. Namely,
following an unexpected increase in inﬂation, the total real resources transferred from the entrepreneur
to households are reduced and, as a consequence, the entrepreneur's net worth increases.
As CMR point out, the accelerator and Fisher eﬀect mechanisms reinforce each other in the case
of shocks that move inﬂation and output in the same direction (e.g., monetary policy shocks), whereas
they dampen the macroeconomic transmission of shocks that move inﬂation and output in opposite
directions (e.g., technology shocks).
4.2 The shadow banking system
4.2.1 Safer entrepreneurs
Proﬁt maximization
At the beginning of period t, the representative l-th entrepreneur provides capital services to intermediate-
good ﬁrms. Capital services, KL,lt , are related to the entrepreneur's stock of physical capital, K¯
L,l
t , by
KL,lt = u
L,l
t K¯
L,l
t , where u
L,l
t denotes the level of capital utilization. In choosing the capital utilization
rate, the entrepreneur takes into account the increasing and convex utilization cost function a
(
uL,lt
)
,
that denotes the cost, in units of ﬁnal goods, of setting the utilization rate to uL,lt .
13
Then, at the end of period t, the entrepreneur sells the undepreciated capital to capital producers at
price Qk¯′,t, pays the nominal coupon rate (R
coupon
t ) on bonds issued and purchases new capital from
capital producers at price Qk¯′,t. The capital acquisition is ﬁnanced partly by his net worth, N
L,l
t+1, and
partly by issuing new bonds. The amount of bonds issued, BIL,lt+1, is given by:
BIL,lt+1 = Qk¯′,tK¯
L,l
t+1 −NL,lt+1 . (2)
The entrepreneur's time-t proﬁts, ΠL,lt , are given by:
ΠL,lt =
[
uL,lt r
k,L
t − a
(
uL,lt
)]
K¯L,lt Pt + (1− δ)Qk¯′,tK¯L,lt
−Qk¯′,tK¯L,lt+1 −Rcoupont
(
Qk¯′,t−1K¯
L,l
t −NL,lt
)
,
where rk,Lt denotes the real rental rate, Pt the price of the ﬁnal good and δ the depreciation rate.
12 Fisher (1933) emphasizes the debt deﬂation eﬀect that arises when debt contracts are set in nominal terms. Other
papers that analize the debt-deﬂation eﬀect include Iacoviello (2005) and Gerali et al. (2010).
13 The functional form that we use is a
(
uL,lt
)
= r
k,L
σLa
[
exp
σLa
(
u
L,l
t −1
)
−1
]
, where rk,L is the steady state value of the
rental rate of capital, a (1) = 0, a
′′
(1) > 0 and σLa = a
′′
(1) /a
′
(1) is a parameter that controls the degree of convexity
of costs.
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In period t the entrepreneur chooses the capital utilization rate and the desired capital to use in period
t+ 1 so as to maximize ΠL,lt , taking as given the coupon rate to be paid on the bonds issued. The ﬁrst
order conditions with respect to uL,lt and K¯
L,l
t+1 are, respectively:
rk,Lt = a
′ (
uL,lt
)
(3)
Qk¯′,t = βEt
{[
uL,lt+1r
k,L
t+1 − a
(
uL,lt+1
)]
Pt+1 + (1− δ)Qk¯′,t+1 −Rcoupont+1 Qk¯′,t
}
. (4)
Equation (3) states that the rental rate on capital services equals the marginal cost of providing those
services. As the rental rate increases it becomes more proﬁtable to use capital more intensively up
to the point where the extra proﬁts match the extra utilization costs. The capital Euler equation (4)
equates the value of a unit of installed capital at time t to the expected discounted return of that extra
unit of capital in period t+ 1.
The entrepreneur's equity at the end of period t, V L,lt , is given by
V L,lt =
{[
uL,lt r
k,L
t − a
(
uL,lt
)]
Pt + (1− δ)Qk¯′,t
}
K¯L,lt − (1 +Rcoupont )
(
Qk¯′,t−1K¯
L,l
t −NL,lt
)
.
The ﬁrst term represents the rental income of capital, net of utilization costs, and the proceeds from
selling undepreciated capital to capital producers. The second term represents the payment (coupon
and principal) of the bonds issued in period t− 1.
To avoid a situation in which the entrepreneur accumulates enough net worth to become self-ﬁnanced,
we assume that there is a constant probability of death. Namely, in each period the entrepreneur exits
the economy with probability 1− γL. In that case, the entrepreneur rebates his equity to households
in a lump-sum way:
transfer to households =
(
1− γL)V L,lt .
To keep the entrepreneurs' population constant, a new entrepreneur is born with probability 1− γL.
The total entrepreneur's net worth NL,lt+1 combines total equity and a transfer, W
e,L,l
t , received from
households, which corresponds to the initial net worth necessary for the entrepreneur's activity to
start. The law of motion for the entrepreneur's net worth is:
NL,lt+1 = γ
LV L,lt +W
e,L,l
t .
Financing cost minimization problem and funds demand curve
We assume that each investment bank z has some market power in conducting its intermediation
services. An entrepreneur seeking an amount of borrowing for period t + 1 equal to BIL,lt+1, deﬁned
by (2), would therefore allocate his borrowing among diﬀerent investment banks, BIL,lt+1 (z), so as to
minimize the total repayment due. At the end of period t, the entrepreneur chooses how much to
borrow from bank z by solving the following problem:
min
BIL,lt+1(z)
ˆ 1
0
[
1 +Rcoupont+1 (z)
]
BIL,lt+1 (z) dz
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subject to the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator
BIL,lt+1 =

ˆ 1
0
[
BIL,lt+1 (z)
] εcoupont+1 −1
ε
coupon
t+1 dz

ε
coupon
t+1
ε
coupon
t+1
−1
,
where Rcoupont+1 (z) is the interest rate charged by the z-th bank and ε
coupon
t+1 > 1 is the time-varying inter-
est rate elasticity of the demand for funds. The ﬁrst order condition yields the following entrepreneur's
demand for funds:
BIL,lt+1 (z) =
(
1 +Rcoupont+1 (z)
1 +Rcoupont+1
)−εcoupont+1
BIL,lt+1 ,
where Rcoupont+1 is the nominal average coupon rate prevailing in the market at time t+ 1, deﬁned as:
1 +Rcoupont+1 =
{ˆ 1
0
[
1 +Rcoupont+1 (z)
]1−εcoupont+1 dz} 11−εcoupont+1 .
As expected, the funds demand curve has a negative slope: when the interest rate that the z-th bank
sets increases relatively to the average rate, the entrepreneur decides to borrow less funds from that
bank.
4.2.2 Investment banks
The investment banking sector comprises a continuum of monopolistic competitive investment banks,
indexed by z ∈ [0, 1] , owned by households. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we follow
the recent DSGE banking literature and assume perfect competition in the market for households'
deposits in these banks.14 We also rule out the entry and exit of investment banks. The investment
bank therefore maximizes its proﬁts, taking as given the return to pay to the households. The appendix
A shows that the required return on bonds by households is equal to the risk-free rate, i.e. the central
bank nominal interest rate Ret (see equations A.10 and A.11).
At the end of period t, the z-th investment bank thus solves the following proﬁt maximization problem:
max
Rcoupont+1 (z)
ΠIBt+1 (z) =
{[
1 +Rcoupont+1 (z)
]
BIL,lt+1 (z)−
[
1 +Ret+1
]
BIL,lt+1 (z)
}
(5)
subject to BIL,lt+1 (z) =
(
1 +Rcoupont+1 (z)
1 +Rcoupont+1
)−εcoupont+1
BIL,lt+1 .
The ﬁrst order condition is(
1 +Rcoupont+1 (z)
1 +Rcoupont+1
)−εcoupont+1
− εcoupont+1
1 +Rcoupont+1 (z)−
(
1 +Ret+1
)
1 +Rcoupont+1
(
1 +Rcoupont+1 (z)
1 +Rcoupont+1
)−εcoupont+1 −1
= 0 .
14 See, for instance, Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2007), Andrés and Arce (2009), Kobayashi (2008) and Teranishi (2008).
11
Imposing a symmetric equilibrium and rearranging yields
1 +Rcoupont+1 =
εcoupont+1
εcoupont+1 −1
(
1 +Ret+1
)
, (6)
that is, the coupon rate is set as a markup,
εcoupont+1
εcoupont+1 −1 , over the policy interest rate. The proﬁts of the
investment banking sector in period t+ 1 are given by
ΠIBt+1 =
(
Rcoupont+1 −Ret+1
)
(1− η)BIL,lt+1 , (7)
and are rebated to households.
Assuming that the interest rate elasticity of the demand for funds is constant, εcoupont+1 = ε
coupon,a, the
coupon rate becomes a constant markup applied to the required return by households:
1 +Rcoupon,at+1 =
εcoupon,a
εcoupon,a − 1
(
1 +Ret+1
)
. (8)
In what follows, we consider Rcoupon,at+1 as the normal interest rate on bonds.
4.2.3 Optimism and perverse incentives in the shadow banking sector
In this subsection we extend the model presented in the previous subsection in two respects. First,
we introduce optimism among underwriters in the investment banking sector by considering that an
optimistic underwriter is willing to underwrite bonds at a lower  than the normal  coupon interest
rate. Second, we introduce perverse incentives by assuming that the representative safer entrepreneur
oﬀers side payments to the underwriter in order to borrow at a more favorable interest rate. In
exchange of those side payments, an optimistic underwriter may de facto facilitate the extension of
credit by setting a discounted  relatively to its normal value  bond coupon rate.
We do so by endogenizing the choice of the interest rate elasticity underlying the demand for funds,
εcoupont+1 . Note, from (6), that an increase in the interest rate elasticity leads to, ceteris paribus, a
lower coupon rate. This relation between the elasticity and the coupon rate allows us to separate and
solve the investment bank's proﬁt maximization problem in two steps. First, the underwriter chooses
the interest rate elasticity according to his preferences. Second, he solves the maximization problem
(5), which leads to equation (6). In practice, after determining εcoupont+1 , the underwriter has implicitly
determined the coupon rate that solves the investment bank's proﬁt maximization problem (5).
Optimism
First, we assume that the underwriter becomes optimistic if the entrepreneur pledges a higher value as
collateral. We thus model underwriter's optimism, χt, as a positive function of the entrepreneur's net
worth. To take into account the fact that human beliefs are highly correlated and persistent (Carlson,
2007), we furthermore model optimism as an AR (1) process with high persistence. Accordingly, the
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law of motion for optimism is given by
χt = ρχχt−1 + (1− ρχ)
[
χ¯+ α3
(
NL,lt+1 −NL,l
)]
, (9)
where χ¯, χ¯ = 0, is the steady state level of optimism, ρχ captures the degree of persistence in optimism
and α3 > 0 the sensitivity of optimism with respect to the deviation of the entrepreneur's net worth
from its steady state value (NL,l).
Second, we assume that the interest rate elasticity of the demand for funds is computed as follows:
εcoupon,biasedt+1 = ε
coupon,a (1 + χt) , (10)
which means that positive deviations of optimism from its steady state level increase the interest rate
elasticity of the demand for funds, relatively to its normal value of εcoupon,a. The biased elasticity
results in a lower coupon rate, which may be seen substituting (10) into (6), yielding the following
expression
1 +Rcoupon,biasedt+1 =
εcoupon,biasedt+1
εcoupon,biasedt+1 − 1
(
1 +Ret+1
)
, (11)
where Rcoupon,biasedt+1 is the biased coupon rate that an optimistic underwriter would set on the bonds
issued. Comparing (11) and (8), it is clear that the optimistic underwriter would underwrite bonds at
a lower than the normal interest rate.
The coupon rate set by the underwriter (Rcoupont+1 in 6) thus varies from a maximum of R
coupon,a
t+1 (cor-
responding to εcoupon,at+1 ) to a minimum of R
coupon,biased
t+1 (corresponding to ε
coupon,biased
t+1 ). In between
these extremes, the value of the coupon rate chosen corresponds to a speciﬁc value of εcoupont+1 . In the
next subsection we thus describe how such interest rate elasticity and, as a consequence, the bond
coupon rate, are determined.
Perverse incentives and the optimal choice of the coupon rate
Suppose that the entrepreneur oﬀers side payments to the underwriter in order to borrow at a more
favorable coupon rate, i.e. at an interest rate lower than the normal rate Rcoupon,at+1 deﬁned by (8).
Suppose also that households are not aware of this possibility. We assume that the amount of side
payments paid to the underwriter at the end of period t+ 1 is given by
side paymentst+1 = Ω
(
Rcoupon,at+1 −Rcoupont+1
)
V L,lt+1 , (12)
that is, side payments represent a ﬁxed share, Ω, of the entrepreneurial equity and are proportional
to the diﬀerence between Rcoupon,at+1 and R
coupon
t+1 . In principle, the underwriter should ignore these
side payments and protect stockholders' interests, that is, the underwriter should maximize the bank's
proﬁts setting Rcoupont+1 = R
coupon,a
t+1 . In that case, as equation (12) shows, he would not receive any side
payments. However, the underwriter may alternatively choose to underwrite a bond at a lower rate
(Rcoupont+1 < R
coupon,a
t+1 ) beneﬁtting from those side payments. Clearly, side payments lead to an agency
conﬂict within the investment bank, between its stockholders (i.e., households) and its staﬀ (i.e., the
13
underwriters). Note that the lower the Rcoupont+1 (compared to R
coupon,a
t+1 ), the higher will be the side
payments that the underwriter receives and the lower will be the stockholders' return for a given level
of BIL,lt+1 (as given by equation 7).
15
The top part of ﬁgure 2 sketches the trade-oﬀ faced by the underwriter  maximization of his own
beneﬁt versus maximization of stockholders' proﬁts. To endogenize the choice of εcoupont+1 , we model
this trade-oﬀ considering the following quadratic utility function for the underwriter:
u
(
εcoupont+1
)
= −r2
(
εcoupon,biasedt+1 − εcoupont+1
)2
− (1− r2)
(
εcoupont+1 − εcoupon,a
)2
, 0 ≤ r2 ≤ 1 . (13)
The ﬁrst part mirrors the underwriter's private objective to maximize the amount of side payments
received. Recall that, from equation (12), side payments are maximized when Rcoupont+1 is as low
as possible, that is, when Rcoupont+1 = R
coupon,biased
t+1 . This happens when ε
coupon
t+1 = ε
coupon,biased
t+1 .
Parameter r2 represents the importance the underwriter attaches to his private objective. The second
part displays the underwriter's objective to maximize stockholders' proﬁts by setting an εcoupont+1 that is
as close as possible to εcoupon,a. This objective enters the underwriter's utility function with a weight
of (1− r2).
The underwriter chooses εcoupont+1 so as to maximize (13). The ﬁrst order condition is:
2r2
(
εcoupon,biasedt+1 − εcoupont+1
)
− 2 (1− r2)
(
εcoupont+1 − εcoupon,a
)
= 0 .
Using (10) and rearranging, the ﬁrst order condition then becomes
εcoupont+1 = ε
coupon,a (1 + r2χt) . (14)
Substituting (14) into (6) yields the following expression for the coupon interest rate
1 +Rcoupont+1 =
εcoupon,a (1 + r2χt)
εcoupon,a (1 + r2χt)− 1
(
1 +Ret+1
)
. (15)
The coupon rate is therefore a time-varying markup, ε
coupon,a(1+r2χt)
εcoupon,a(1+r2χt)−1 , over the policy rate and is
inﬂuenced both by the level of optimism and by the weight that the underwriter attaches to his private
beneﬁt. As a result, the optimistic underwriter may de facto set a coupon rate for the issued bonds
that is lower than the rate that maximizes the bank's proﬁts in the context of no optimism and no side
payments. Note, in particular, that it is the combination of underwriter's optimism and his willingness
to receive side payments (χt > 0 and r2 > 0) that leads to a discounted coupon rate.
15 If there are side payments, before knowing whether exiting the economy, the entrepreneur transfers a share
Ω
(
Rcoupon,at −Rcoupont
)
of his equity to the underwriter as side payments. After that, with probability 1 − γL the
entrepreneur exits the economy and rebates his equity to households in a lump-sum way:
transfer to households =
(
1− γL
) [
1− Ω (Rcoupon,at −Rcoupont )]V L,lt .
Entrepreneurial net worth is thus given by
NL,lt+1 = γ
L
[
1− Ω (Rcoupon,at −Rcoupont )]V L,lt +W e,L,lt .
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Figure 2: The underwriter's trade-oﬀ
The bottom part of ﬁgure 2 shows that the exact value of the coupon rate that is chosen  corresponding
to a unique value of εcoupon  depends upon the value of r2 and the degree of optimism.
5 The response to monetary policy shocks
Having presented the model, we now analyze its dynamics. We ﬁrst describe the calibration of the
model and then present the impulse responses to two types of monetary policy shocks.
The central bank sets the short-term nominal interest rate, Ret , following a Taylor-type interest rate
rule. Speciﬁcally, the monetary policy rule allows for interest rate smoothing and interest rate responses
to deviations of expected inﬂation (Etpit+1) and current output (Yt) from their steady states:
Ret =
(
Ret−1
)ρ˜ [
Re
(
Etpit+1
p¯i
)αpi (Yt
Y¯
)αy](1−ρ˜)
εMPt , (16)
where Re, p¯i and Y¯ are the steady state values of Ret , pit and Yt, respectively, αpi and αy are the weights
assigned to expected inﬂation and output, ρ˜ captures interest rate smoothing and εMPt is a white noise
monetary policy shock.
15
We ﬁrst solve numerically the model, for the steady state, using the computational procedure de-
scribed in appendix C. We then compute the ﬁrst-order Taylor series approximation to the equilibrium
conditions in the neighborhood of the steady state.16
We compare the responses to monetary impulses under three diﬀerent variants of the above-described
model:
• variant 1: the simpliﬁed version of the Financial Accelerator Model of CMR, which corresponds
to setting the share of riskier entrepreneurs η equal to 1;
• variant 2: our model including the shadow banking system but excluding optimism and side
payments, which is obtained setting r2 = 0;
• variant 3: our model including optimism and side payments in the shadow banking system,
assuming r2 = 1, i.e. the version in which the underwriter only cares about his own beneﬁt and
maximizes the amount of side payments received.
Recall from subsection 4.1 that the transmission mechanism in variant 1 is aﬀected by two general
equilibrium mechanisms. The ﬁrst one is the Bernanke et al. (1999) ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect,
whereby induced changes in asset prices alter the value of the collateral that the entrepreneur can
pledge and, hence, the contractual loan rate. The second mechanism is a CMR-type Fisher deﬂation
eﬀect, whereby unexpected movements in the price level alter the ex-post real burden of entrepreneurial
debt and, hence, the entrepreneur's net worth.
To these two channels, variant 2 adds a new set of monopolistic investment banks. The monopolistic
power in setting bond interest rates aﬀects the credit supply conditions of a set of entrepreneurs
through the introduction of a constant interest rate spread. Hence, this variant allows us to analyze
whether the interest-rate-setting by banks interacts with the aforementioned channels and to what
extent it does modify the monetary transmission mechanism.17
Finally, variant 3 adds optimism and perverse incentives to the monopolistic banking competition
eﬀect. In this variant, the underwriter diverts a fraction of stockholders' proﬁts for his own beneﬁt and
extends credit at a lower interest rate. In this framework, the behavior of the underwriter inﬂuences
the credit supply conditions of a set of borrowers, which in turn inﬂuences the real economy through a
countercyclical time-varying interest rate spread. This variant allows us to study the importance of the
bank manager's behavior in shaping the monetary transmission mechanism, which has been virtually
ignored in the literature so far.
16 All simulations in this paper have been conducted with Dynare. Codes are available from the corresponding author
upon request.
17 We should note that, as far as we know, at most two out of these three eﬀects  ﬁnancial accelerator, Fisher
deﬂation and monopolistic banking competition  have been analyzed within a single model. As regards studies
that address only one of the eﬀects, when compared to standard models with frictionless ﬁnancial markets, CMR show
that the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect, as well as the Fisher deﬂation eﬀect, amplify and propagate the transmission of
monetary policy shocks, while Andrés and Arce (2009) ﬁnd that monopolistic competition in the banking sector dampens
the macroeconomic transmission of policy shocks. As regards studies that combine two of these eﬀects, Iacoviello (2005)
and CMR show that the accelerator and the Fisher eﬀect reinforce each other in what concerns the response of the
economy to monetary policy shocks, whereas Mandelman (2010) ﬁnds that the assumption of an imperfectly competitive
banking system in the Bernanke et al. (1999) framework magniﬁes the propagation and ampliﬁcation of policy shocks
to the economy.
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We conduct two policy experiments. The ﬁrst experiment is a one-period expansionary monetary
policy shock. It allows us to assess whether (and how) the transmission mechanism of monetary policy
is aﬀected by the presence of a shadow banking system using as a benchmark the impulse responses
of a workhorse DSGE model (variant 1).
In the second experiment, we create a persistently low interest rate scenario by forcing the nominal
interest rate to be 25 basis points lower than its steady state value during 8 quarters. This experiment
allows for a) determining if an extended period of loose monetary policy generates per se a boom-
bust cycle and b) analyzing whether the interaction between long periods of accommodative monetary
policy and perverse incentives in the ﬁnancial sector causes and/or ampliﬁes ﬂuctuations in real and
ﬁnancial activity.
The next subsection brieﬂy describes the calibration, before turning to the analysis of the impulse
response functions in subsections 5.2 and 5.3.
5.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy, assuming that a period is a quarter. The values are chosen
so that the model's steady state reproduces some key features in the U.S. data. In this subsection we
only describe the calibration of the parameters related with the shadow banking system. The values
of the remaining parameters are calibrated within the range usually considered in the New Keynesian
literature.18 Table 1 reports the values of the calibrated parameters, and tables 2 and 3 report the
steady state implications of the model and their empirical counterparts.
To match the return on time deposits (which is also equal to the steady state central bank nominal
interest rate), we set the discount factor β to 0.9875. Equation (6) shows that the steady state spread
between the coupon rate and the risk-free rate (the yield spread) depends on the interest rate elasticity
εcoupon. Chen et al. (2007) report an average annual yield spread of AAA bonds of 84 basis points.
Accordingly, we set εcoupon to 510 so that the annual yield spread is around 80 basis points. As a
result, the coupon rate paid by safer entrepreneurs is 5.9 %/year.
To match the observed average leverage ratio, we set the survival probability of safer entrepreneurs
γL to 0.96. In the law of motion for optimism (9), we set the persistence parameter ρχ to 0.9 and the
sensitivity to entrepreneur's net worth α3 to 40.
19
The parameter Ω (the fraction of equity that the entrepreneur is willing to pay as side payments) is
chosen so as to guarantee that the entrepreneur is always better oﬀ when he pays side payments. In
principle, the safer entrepreneur may choose between two options. He can either pay the coupon rate
Rcoupon,at+1 given by equation 8 or he can oﬀer side payments and obtain a lower coupon rate (R
coupon
t+1
18 The values of the parameters related with the riskier entrepreneurial sector are primarily chosen to match the cost
of external ﬁnance, i.e., the contractual, no-default interest rate on entrepreneurial debt (Zt resulting from A.7). Setting
the fraction of realized payoﬀs lost in bankruptcy, µ, to 0.15 and the standard deviation of the entrepreneur idiosyncratic
productivity shock, σ, to 0.55 yields Z = 6.8 %/year, which is close to observed data. This in turn also guarantees
that, in equilibrium, bond ﬁnancing is cheaper than bank ﬁnancing (safer entrepreneurs ﬁnance themselves at a more
favorable interest rate). To match the observed leverage ratio, we set the survival rate γH to 0.97.
19 This calibration guarantees that εcoupont+1 = ε
coupon,a (1 + r2χt) > 1 ∀t.
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given by equation 15). This choice depends on the value of Ω. Given our baseline calibration, in
appendix D we show that, in the steady state, the entrepreneur is better oﬀ whenever Ω is smaller
than a threshold level Ω¯ = 0.25. Accordingly, we set Ω to 0.1, thus assuming that the entrepreneur
gives away 10 % of his equity as side payments to obtain a lower coupon rate.
Finally, we calibrate the parameter η (the share of riskier entrepreneurs in the economy) by replicating
the ratio of bond ﬁnance to bank ﬁnance in the U.S. economy which, according to De Fiore and Uhlig
(2005), is equal to 1.34. We closely match this ratio by setting η to 0.3.
As tables 2 and 3 show, the model is successful in reproducing most of the salient features of the U.S.
economy: key macroeconomic and leverage ratios, interest rates and, importantly, its ﬁnancial market
structure.
5.2 The economy's response to an unanticipated one-period expansionary
monetary policy shock
In this subsection we study the transmission of a monetary policy shock by analyzing the impulse
responses to a one-period innovation in the short-term nominal interest rate (εMPt in 16), corresponding
to a 25 basis points reduction of the annualized nominal interest rate. Figures 3-5 illustrate the impulse
responses of the key variables under the three variants of the model (variant 1: blue solid line; variant
2: red crossed line; and variant 3: black circled line).
In all ﬁgures presented, variables are expressed in percent deviation from their steady state values,
except for inﬂation, that is expressed as annualized percent deviation from its steady state, and interest
rates, that are expressed in percentage points at annual rate. The horizontal axis represents time on
a quarterly scale.
The responses of aggregate variables in variant 1 are qualitatively standard. After the initial drop,
the nominal interest rate gradually returns to its steady state value. Aggregate quantities  output,
consumption and investment  as well as inﬂation display a hump-shaped response and peak after
about three to six quarters. The price of capital shows maximum upward reactions at impact before
returning to its steady state. The eﬀects on aggregate variables are long-lived despite the fact that the
eﬀects on the nominal interest rate only last for roughly two years.
Overall, the response of lending activity is weak at the aggregate level: although entrepreneurs accu-
mulate more capital (stock of capital ↑), the sharp increase in the aggregate net worth (N ↑) leads
to a decrease of total credit (qK¯ −N) below its steady state level.
While in most cases the responses in variant 2 are pretty similar to those in variant 1, it is notable
that the impact of the monetary policy shock is somewhat dampened under this variant. We ﬁnd, in
line with other studies, that the introduction of market power in banking results in smoother eﬀects.
A striking diﬀerence is evident, however, when we compare the responses in variant 3 with those in
the other two variants of the model. First, the business cycle is ampliﬁed  in particular, the peak in
investment is two times greater than under variant 2. Second, at its height, the response of investment
is roughly twice as big, in percent terms, as the response of output (while it is nearly the same in
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the other variants). Finally, and in contrast with the other two variants of the model, total credit
increases: the rise in aggregate entrepreneurial capital purchases more than compensates the more
pronounced (compared to the other variants) increase in the aggregate net worth, so that the net
eﬀect is an increase of total credit above its steady state value. This can be explained by analyzing
each type of entrepreneur separately.
Therefore, turning to the variables speciﬁc to the entrepreneurial sector, we conclude that under the
three variants of the model the riskier entrepreneur's net worth increases in response to the shock
because of both the accelerator and the Fisher eﬀects. The rise in the price of capital leads to a
boost in the value of the assets of the entrepreneur, which in turn reduces the probability of bankruptcy
(ω¯ ↓). Moreover, because of the drop in entrepreneur's leverage, retail bank charges a lower interest
rate on loans (Z ↓). This reﬂects the fact that the cost of external ﬁnancing depends on the borrower's
leverage: as predicted by equation (1), all else equal, the lower the leverage, the lower the external
ﬁnance premium, hence the lower the interest rate on loans. This accelerator eﬀect is then reinforced
by the Fisher eﬀect: the ex-post value of existing entrepreneurial debt decreases as inﬂation rises.
As a consequence, the entrepreneur's net worth increases further.
In both variants 2 and 3, the monetary policy shock leads to a lower coupon rate paid by the safer
entrepreneur. Under variant 2 the coupon rate is set as a constant markup over the policy rate (recall
equation 8), therefore Rcoupon follows the nominal interest rate path. In variant 3, however, the coupon
rate also depends on the underwriter's behavior (equation 15). In particular, the rise in the price of
capital increases the value of the collateral held by the entrepreneur (net worth ↑), which in turn
triggers optimism (equation 9). The underwriter's optimism, combined with his willingness to receive
side payments (r2 = 1), leads to a drop in the bond coupon rate larger than that in variant 2. As
ﬁgure 5 shows, Rcoupon |variant 3 is smaller than Rcoupon |variant 2 for about 20 quarters, that is, the
underwriter persistently extends credit at a lower interest rate in exchange of side payments.
Thus, in both variants 2 and 3, the monetary policy shock leads to a lower borrowing cost for both
types of entrepreneurs  both Z and Rcoupon decrease. However, note that the underwriter's behavior
and preferences inﬂuence the spread between the cost of ﬁnancing for the riskier entrepreneur and
the coupon rate on bonds for the safer entrepreneur (Z − Rcoupon, in ﬁgure 5). This spread in turn
strongly inﬂuences the allocation of funds between safer and riskier entrepreneurs and, consequently,
total capital and total credit dynamics.
In fact, in variant 2 the drop in Z is larger than the drop in Rcoupon (Z−Rcoupon ↓). That is, ﬁnancing
in the loan market becomes relatively cheaper than funding in the bond market. As a result, there
is an increase in the amount of borrowing from retail banks (loans ↑) and a reduction in the ﬂow of
funds to the safer entrepreneur (bond amount ↓). Diﬀerently, in variant 3, Z −Rcoupon increases, i.e.
given the marked reduction in the coupon rate due to optimistic behavior, bond ﬁnancing becomes
relatively cheaper than bank ﬁnancing, leading safer entrepreneurs to invest more (bond amount ↑),
while the amount of borrowing from retail banks drops (loans ↓). Riskier entrepreneur thus prefer to
use capital more intensively (when compared with variant 2). Overall, the increase in capital stock is
higher than under variant 2 since the increase in bonds issued more than oﬀsets the decrease of loan
amount.
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These ﬁndings suggest that ﬁnancial market frictions alone  in the form of monopolistic competition
in banking system  do not change signiﬁcantly the model's dynamics, whereas the behavior of the
ﬁnancial intermediary  driven by optimism and perverse incentives  does play a role in the transmis-
sion of the monetary policy shock: the eﬀects of monetary policy on real and ﬁnancial activity are in
fact ampliﬁed in the variant of the model in which the ﬁnancial intermediary plays a more active role.
5.3 The economy's response in a persistently low interest rate scenario
At the macroeconomic level, it has been recognized that accommodative monetary policies have his-
torically been a key factor in driving boom-bust cycles of all types.20 Although the low level of the
federal funds rate in the early 2000s is generally considered to have helped fuel the housing bubble that
burst in 2007, it is still an open debate whether lax monetary policies played a key role in generating
the boom-bust cycle.21
In addition to and interacting with the low interest rate environment prevailing at the beginning of
the 2000s, microeconomic factors related to recent innovations in the ﬁnancial market structure and
products may have also contributed to the subprime crisis. Even though the interaction between
microeconomic distortions in the ﬁnancial sector and a persistently loose monetary policy environ-
ment seems to have been relevant in generating and/or amplifying the boom-bust cycle, the relative
importance of each of these factors is still open to debate.
Our model is well-suited to analyze the interaction between long periods of accommodative monetary
policy and ﬁnancial market distortions, as well as to disentangle their relative importance. To do so, in
this subsection we create a persistently low interest rate scenario and analyze the model's dynamics.
We reproduce such a scenario by combining the right sequence of monetary policy innovations (εMPt
in equation 16) in order to hold the nominal interest rate 25 basis points lower than its steady state
value during 8 quarters. There are thus eight consecutive monetary policy shocks, each coming as a
surprise to the agents. The overall impulse responses are then obtained by summing up the responses
to each of the successive monetary policy shocks.
Figures 6-8 display the impulse responses of several variables under the three variants of the model. By
construction, the nominal interest rate deviates from its steady-state value by 25 basis points during
8 quarters. Then, from period 9 onwards, its dynamics is governed by the Taylor rule with response
to deviations of expected inﬂation and current output from their respective steady states. In period
8, inﬂation and output are well above their steady state values. Hence, starting from period 9, the
nominal interest rate rises and gradually reverts to its steady state value.
The dynamic responses of aggregate variables are qualitatively similar across the three variants of the
model. Output, investment, consumption, inﬂation and the price of capital rise until period 8. The
subsequent monetary tightening leads to a contraction of output, consumption and investment and a
rapid decline in the price of capital.
20 See, for instance, Bordo (2008) and Calomiris (2008).
21 The Fed funds rate was gradually reduced from around 6.50% in November 2000 to around 1.75% in December
2001 and was kept at that level until December 2002. Then, after two policy interventions (November 2002 and June
2003), it was reduced and kept to 1% until June 2004.
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Nevertheless, variant 3 exhibits responses that are quantitatively diﬀerent. The eﬀects of monetary
policy shocks on the real economy are considerably ampliﬁed  the peak in output is about 35% higher
and the response in investment is about twice as large as that in the other variants of the model. The
eﬀects on ﬁnancial variables are magniﬁed as well. The percentage increase in the price of capital, at
its peak, is roughly the double of the increase that occurs in the other variants. Moreover, after the
initial jump, the price of capital rises 60% during the boom phase, which is more than four (eleven)
times the increase in variant 1 (2) during the same period. Note also that the pattern of the price of
capital mimics the typical shape of an asset price bubble: the large and rapid asset price increase is
followed by a burst and then a collapse.
The most striking diﬀerence which, of course, underlies the dynamics of the other aggregate variables,
is that, whereas lending activity is weak at the aggregate level under variants 1 and 2, the persistent
monetary easing leads to a lending boom in variant 3 that lasts well after the roughly 4 years it takes
for the eﬀects on the nominal interest rate to die away. Looking at the entrepreneurial variables,
it is evident that the boom in total credit is driven by the safer entrepreneur's demand for funds
(bond amount ↑).
Figure 8 allows us to trace the monetary transmission mechanism in variant 3. The rise in the price
of capital leads to a boost in the safer entrepreneur's net worth, which in turn triggers an optimistic
sentiment by the underwriter. This optimism, when combined with the underwriter's willingness to
receive side payments  as well as with the increase in the amount of these payments induced by the
increase in the entrepeneur's net worth (equation 12)  leads the underwriter to set a signiﬁcantly lower
coupon rate on the bonds issued. In particular, the discount relative to the normal rate occurs on
impact and continues further during the period of persistently low interest rate, as Rcoupon is well below
the normal coupon rate Rcoupon,a and further declines as time goes on. The protracted opportunity for
the safer entrepreneur to have access to an abnormally cheap source of funds  both in absolute terms
(Rcoupon ↓) and relatively to the cost of borrowing in the loan market (Z −Rcoupon ↑)  leads him to
accumulate capital aggressively. As a result, the safer entrepreneur's demand for capital rises, pushing
up aggregate demand and causing a boom in the price of capital. The rise in safer entrepreneur's
capital purchases more than compensates the increase in his net worth, so that the net eﬀect is an
increase of bond issued much above its steady state value. Finally, in general equilibrium, relatively
higher borrowing cost for the riskier entrepreneur (when compared to bond coupon rate) induces him
to cut capital expenditures and to use his capital more intensively.
Overall, these ﬁndings indicate that a persistently loose monetary policy does not cause per se a
boom-bust cycle. In fact, neither in the CMR model, nor in its augmented version with monopolistic
banking competition, a too low for too long interest rate policy generates a boom-bust cycle. However,
monetary policy does create the preconditions for a boom-bust: optimism and perverse incentives in
the ﬁnancial sector, when coupled with a persistently low interest rate environment, result in greatly
ampliﬁed ﬂuctuations in both real and ﬁnancial variables.22
22 We have checked the sensitivity of our results to changes in the values of parameters η and Ω. We have considered
three diﬀerent values of η, namely 0.368, 0.45 and 0.81, which imply a bond to bank ﬁnance ratio of, respectively, 1,
0.7 and 0.13 (the latter value reproduces the ﬁnancial market structure of the Euro Area). Although the qualitative
responses are quite similar to those of the baseline calibration, quantitatively the eﬀects on both real and ﬁnancial
variables become dampened as bank ﬁnancing becomes more important. Finally, changing the value of parameter Ω
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6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes whether long periods of loose monetary policy play a key role in generating a
boom-bust cycle, as well as the role of perverse incentives in the ﬁnancial sector in causing and/or
amplifying ﬂuctuations in real and ﬁnancial activity during periods of accommodative monetary policy.
Starting from a model that nests most contemporary DSGE monetary models, we have introduced
a microfounded bond market comprised of a monopolistically competitive investment banking sector.
The underwriter within the investment bank, who sets the coupon rate on the bonds issued either
as a constant markup over the nominal interest rate, or at a discounted rate due to the likelihood of
receiving side payments, is the pivotal agent in our model.
We have ﬁrst analyzed the responses to a one-period expansionary monetary policy shock. The results
show that ﬁnancial market frictions alone  in the form of monopolistic competition in the banking
sector  do not change signiﬁcantly the model's dynamics (when compared with a workhorse DSGE
model). Yet, the eﬀects of monetary policy on economic activity are ampliﬁed in the model in which
the underwriter facilitates the extension of credit when optimism and perverse incentives are taken
into account.
We have then simulated a persistently low interest rate scenario by keeping the central bank nominal
interest rate 25 basis points below its steady state value for 8 quarters. Our main result is that a
too low for too long interest rate policy does create the preconditions for, but does not cause per se,
a boom-bust cycle. In fact, ﬂuctuations in both real and ﬁnancial variables are markedly ampliﬁed
only when optimism and perverse incentives in the ﬁnancial sector are coupled with such a persistently
accommodative monetary policy environment. These ﬁndings suggest that, to reduce the odds of future
booms, busts and asset price bubbles, policymakers should focus on tuning the ﬁnancial architecture
and reinforcing the ﬁnancial supervision to restrain optimistic behaviors and perverse incentives. In
doing so, policymakers will protect the ﬁnancial system and the economy as a whole from the negative
and often disruptive eﬀects associated with economic booms and busts.
does not aﬀect the overall dynamics of the model, as long as Ω < Ω¯.
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Appendix A - The complete model
Final-good ﬁrms
Perfectly competitive ﬁrms produce the ﬁnal good that is converted into household consumption goods,
investment goods, government goods, goods used up in capital utilization and in bank monitoring as
well as for underwriter consumption goods.
The representative ﬁrm produces the ﬁnal good Yt, using the intermediate goods Yi,t , and the pro-
duction technology
Yt =
[ˆ 1
0
Y
1
λf
i,t di
]λf
,
where λf , ∞ > λf ≥ 1, is the markup for the intermediate-good ﬁrms. The representative ﬁrm
chooses Yi,t to maximize its proﬁts, taking the output price, Pt, and the input prices, Pi,t, as given.
The maximization problem of the representative ﬁrm is thus given by:
max
Yi,t
PtYt −
ˆ 1
0
Pi,tYi,tdi
subject to Yt =
[ˆ 1
0
Y
1
λf
i,t di
]λf
.
Solving the proﬁt maximization problem yields the following demand function for the intermediate
good i
Yi,t =
(
Pi,t
Pt
) λf
1−λf
Yt .
Perfect competition in the ﬁnal goods market implies that he price of the ﬁnal good can be written as:
Pt =
[ˆ 1
0
P
1
1−λf
i,t di
]1−λf
. (A.1)
Intermediate-good ﬁrms
Monopolistic competitive ﬁrms, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], produce diﬀerentiated intermediate goods using
the following production function:
Yi,t = (Ki,t)
α
(Li,t)
1−α
, (A.2)
where 0 < α < 1 and Ki,t and Li,t denote, respectively, the capital and labor input for the production
of good i.
The capital input is assumed to be a composite of two entrepreneur-speciﬁc bundles of capital ser-
vices, KHi,t and K
L
i,t which in turn combine the capital services of the individual members of the two
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entrepreneur sectors, KH,ri,t and K
L,l
i,t . Formally,
Ki,t =
[
η1−ρ
(
KHi,t
)ρ
+ (1− η)1−ρ (KLi,t)ρ] 1ρ , (A.3)
where ρ denotes the degree of substitutability between the two entrepreneur-speciﬁc bundles of cap-
ital services and, since all entrepreneurs are identical within each group, KHi,t = ηK
H,r
i,t and K
L
i,t =
(1− η)KL,li,t .
The i-th ﬁrm hires labor and rents capital in competitive markets by minimizing its production costs,
taking as given the nominal wage rate, Wt, and the real rental rates of capital, r
k,H
t and r
k,L
t . The
ﬁrm i's optimal demand for capital and labor services must thus solve the following cost minimization
problem:
min
{Li,t,KHi,t,KLi,t}
C (·) = WtLi,t
Pt
+KHi,tr
k,H
t +K
L
i,tr
k,L
t (A.4)
subject to (A.2) and (A.3).
Since all ﬁrms i face the same input prices and since they all have access to the same production
technology, real marginal costs st are identical across ﬁrms and are given by
st =
[
w˜t
1− α
]1− α
ρ+α(1−ρ)
[
α
rk,Ht
(
KH,rt
)ρ−1]− αρ+α(1−ρ)
(Yt)
α(ρ−1)
ρ+α(1−ρ) ρ
ρ+ α (1− ρ) ,
where w˜t denotes the real wage.
Price setting
Prices are determined through a variant of the Calvo's (1983) mechanism. In particular, every ﬁrm
faces a constant probability, 1 − ξp, of reoptimizing its price in any given period, whereas the non-
reoptimizing ﬁrms set their prices according to the indexation rule
Pi,t = Pi,t−1 (p¯i)
ι1 (pit−1)
1−ι1 ,
where p¯i represents the steady state inﬂation rate, pit−1 = Pt−1/Pt−2 is the inﬂation rate from t − 2
to t − 1 and the parameter ι1, 0 ≤ ι1 ≤ 1, represents the degree of price indexation to steady state
inﬂation. The i-th ﬁrm that optimizes its price at time t chooses Pi,t = P˜i,t that maximizes the present
value of future expected nominal proﬁts:
max
Pi,t
ΠIGFt = Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βξp)
τ
λt+τ [(Pi,t+τ − St+τ )Yi,t+τ ]
subject to Yi,t+τ =
(
Pi,t+τ
Pt+τ
) λf
1−λf
Yt+τ ,
24
where Et denotes the mathematical expectations operator conditional on information available at time
t, λt+τ the multiplier in the households' budget constraint, St+τ the ﬁrm's nominal marginal cost and
β ∈ (0 , 1) the discount factor. At the end of each time period, proﬁts are rebated to households.
We consider only the symmetric equilibrium at which all ﬁrms choose the same P˜t = P˜i,t. Thus, from
(A.1), the law of motion for the aggregate price index is
Pt =
{
(1− ξp) P˜
1
1−λf
t + ξp
[
Pt−1 (p¯i)
ι1 (pit−1)
1−ι1
] 1
1−λf
}1−λf
.
Capital producers
A continuum of competitive capital producers produce the aggregate stock of capital K¯t. New capital
produced in period t can be used in productive activities in period t+1. At the end of period t, capital
producers purchase existing capital, xK,t, from entrepreneurs and investment goods in the ﬁnal good
market, It , and combine them to produce new capital, x
′
K,t, using the following technology:
x
′
K,t = xK,t +A (It, It−1) .
Old capital can be converted one-to-one into new capital, while the transformation of the investment
good is subject to quadratic adjustment costs. The function A (·) summarizes the technology that
transforms current and past investment into installed capital.
Investment goods are purchased in the ﬁnal good market at price Pt. Let Qk¯′,t be the nominal price
of new capital. Since the marginal rate of transformation between new and old capital is unity, the
price of old capital is also Qk¯′,t. The representative capital producer's period-t proﬁt maximization
problem is thus given by
max
{It+τ ,xK,t+τ}
Et
∞∑
τ=0
βτλt+τ
{
Qk¯′,t+τ [xK,t+τ +A (It+τ , It+τ−1)]
−Qk¯′,t+τxK,t+τ − Pt+τIt+τ
}
. (A.5)
Let δ denote the depreciation rate and note that, from (A.5), any value of xK,t+τ is proﬁt maximiz-
ing. Thus considering xK,t+τ = (1− δ) K¯t+τ is consistent with both proﬁt maximization and market
clearing.
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to It is:
Et
[
λt
(
Qk¯′,tA1,t − Pt
)
+ βλt+1Qk¯′,t+1A2,t+1
]
= 0 ,
where
A1,t =
∂A (It, It−1)
∂It
; A2,t+1 =
∂A (It+1, It)
∂It
.
This is the standard Tobin's Q equation that relates the price of capital to the marginal costs of
25
producing investment goods.23
The aggregate capital stock evolves according to
K¯t+1 = ηK¯
H,r
t+1 + (1− η) K¯L,lt+1 = (1− δ)
[
ηK¯H,rt + (1− η) K¯L,lt
]
+A (It, It−1) .
Riskier entrepreneurs and retail banks
The role of the representative retail bank in the model is to collect time deposits from households
in order to ﬁnance riskier entrepreneur's investment project. The bank hedges against credit risk by
charging a premium over the risk-free rate at which it can borrow from households. The risk-free rate
that the bank views as its opportunity cost to lending is a contractual nominal interest rate that is
determined at the time the bank liability to households is issued. Unlike in Bernanke et al. (1999),
this rate is not contingent on the shocks that intervene before the entrepreneurial loan matures.
At each point in time there is a continuum of heterogeneous entrepreneurs of total measure η, indexed
by (H, r). At the end of time t, each entrepreneur is characterized by his net worth, NH,rt+1 , which is
used, in combination with a bank loan, to purchase the time-(t+ 1) stock of capital, K¯H,rt+1 . After the
purchase, the entrepreneur experiences an idiosyncratic productivity shock, ωH,rt+1, which transforms
the purchased capital K¯H,rt+1 into ω
H,r
t+1K¯
H,r
t+1 . By assumption, ω
H,r is independently and identically
distributed over time and across entrepreneurs and follows a log-normal distribution,
ln
(
ωH,r
) ∼ N (−1
2
σ2 , σ2
)
,
where σ is the standard deviation of ln
(
ωH,r
)
.
Capital utilization decision
At the beginning of period t, the representative entrepreneur provides capital services to intermediate-
good ﬁrms. Capital services, KH,rt , are related to the entrepreneur's stock of physical capital, K¯
H,r
t ,
by KH,rt = u
H,r
t K¯
H,r
t , where u
H,r
t denotes the level of capital utilization. In choosing the capital
utilization rate, the entrepreneur takes into account the increasing and convex utilization cost function
23 We adopt the following investment adjustment costs function:
A (It, It−1) =
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)]
It , S
(
It
It−1
)
=
S
′′
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
so that S (1) = S
′
(1) = 0 and S
′′
(1) = S
′′
> 0 in steady state. Therefore
A1,t =
∂A (It, It−1)
∂It
= 1− S
′′
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
− S′′ It
It−1
(
It
It−1
− 1
)
and
A2,t+1 =
∂A (It+1, It)
∂It
= S
′′
(
It+1
It
)2 ( It+1
It
− 1
)
.
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a
(
uH,rt
)
, that denotes the cost, in units of ﬁnal goods, of setting the utilization rate to uH,rt .
24
The entrepreneur chooses uH,rt solving the following maximization problem:
max
uH,rt
[
uH,rt r
k,H
t − a
(
uH,rt
)]
ωH,rK¯H,rt Pt .
After determining the utilization rate of capital and earning rent on it, the entrepreneur sells the
undepreciated part to capital producers at price Qk¯′,t . The entrepreneur's nominal gross rate of
return on capital purchased at time t− 1, 1 +Rk,H,rt , is given by
1 +Rk,H,rt =
[
uH,rt r
k,H
t − a
(
uH,rt
)]
Pt + (1− δ)Qk¯′,t
Qk¯′,t−1
ωH,r .
Because the mean of ωH,r across entrepreneurs is unity, we may deﬁne the average nominal gross rate
of return on capital across all entrepreneurs as follows
1 +Rk,Ht =
[
uH,rt r
k,H
t − a
(
uH,rt
)]
Pt + (1− δ)Qk¯′,t
Qk¯′,t−1
. (A.6)
Loan decision and the standard debt contract
At the end of period t, the entrepreneur has available net worth, NH,rt+1 , which he uses to ﬁnance his
capital expenditures, Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1 . To ﬁnance the diﬀerence between expenditures and net worth, he
borrows an amount BH,rt+1 = Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1 −NH,rt+1 from the retail bank.
After the purchase, the entrepreneur experiences an idiosyncratic productivity shock, ωH,rt+1, which
transforms the purchased capital K¯H,rt+1 into ω
H,r
t+1K¯
H,r
t+1 . Financial frictions arise from asymmetric
information between entrepreneur and bank. In particular, the entrepreneur costlessly observes his
idiosyncratic shock, whereas the bank must pay a monitoring cost  which represent a fraction µ,
0 < µ < 1, of the entrepreneur's gross return  to observe it. The optimal ﬁnancing mechanism is a
standard debt contract which gives the lender the right to all liquidation proceeds in the event of an
entrepreneur's default.
At the end of time t, the bank oﬀers a debt contract to the entrepreneur, which speciﬁes the loan
amount, BH,rt+1, and the gross interest rate on the loan, Z
H,r
t+1 . At time t+ 1, the entrepreneur declares
bankruptcy if ωH,rt+1 is smaller than the default threshold level, ω¯
H,r
t+1, deﬁned by
ω¯H,rt+1
(
1 +Rk,H,rt+1
)
Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1 = Z
H,r
t+1B
H,r
t+1 . (A.7)
Therefore, if ωH,rt+1 > ω¯
H,r
t+1, the entrepreneur pays the lender the amount Z
H,r
t+1B
H,r
t+1 and keeps the re-
maining
(
ωH,rt+1 − ω¯H,rt+1
)(
1 +Rk,H,rt+1
)
Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1 . On the other hand, if ω
H,r
t+1 < ω¯
H,r
t+1, the entrepreneur
24 The functional form that we use is a
(
uH,rt
)
= r
k,H
σHa
[
exp
σHa
(
u
H,r
t −1
)
−1
]
, where rk,H is the steady state value
of the rental rate of capital, a (1) = 0, a
′′
(1) > 0 and σHa = a
′′
(1) /a
′
(1) is a parameter that controls the degree of
convexity of costs.
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defaults and receives nothing, while the bank monitors the entrepreneur at cost µ
(
1 +Rk,H,rt+1
)
ωH,rt+1Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1
and receives all of the residual net worth (1− µ)
(
1 +Rk,H,rt+1
)
ωH,rt+1Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1 .
The bank raises the funds that are necessary to ﬁnance the entrepreneurs activities issuing time deposits
to households, and pays them a nominal rate of return Ret+1. Perfect competition in the banking sector
implies that the following bank's zero proﬁt condition holds in each period:
[
1− Ft
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)]
ZH,rt+1B
H,r
t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue from non−bankrupt entrepreneurs
+ (1− µ)
ˆ ω¯H,rt+1
0
ωH,rdF
(
ωH,r
) (
1 +Rk,H,rt+1
)
Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue, aftermonitoring cost, from bankrupt entrepreneurs
=
(
1 +Ret+1
)
BH,rt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
payment to households
, (A.8)
where Ft
(
ωH,r
)
is the cumulative distribution function of ωH,r.
Let kH,rt+1 =
Q
k¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1
NH,rt+1
denote the ratio of capital expenditures to net worth. Combining (A.7) with
(A.8) and using the deﬁnition of kt+1 yields
[
Γt
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)
− µGt
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)]
kH,rt+1
1 +Rk,Ht+1
1 +Ret+1
= kH,rt+1 − 1 ,
where Gt
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)
=
´ ω¯H,rt+1
0 ω
H,rdF
(
ωH,r
)
and Γt
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)
= ω¯H,rt+1
[
1− Ft
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)]
+ Gt
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)
. The
term Γt
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)
represents the share of entrepreneurial earnings received by the bank and µGt
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)
the expected monitoring costs. Therefore 1−Γt
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)
is the share of proﬁts going to the entrepreneur.
The contract determines the division of the expected proﬁts between borrower and lender. In particular,
the optimal contract maximizes the entrepreneur's expected return at time t + 1 subject to the zero
proﬁt condition on banks. The optimal contracting problem may be written in the following way:
max
{kH,rt+1,ω¯H,rt+1}
Et
{[
1− Γt
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)]
1+Rk,Ht+1
1+Ret+1
kH,rt+1
}
subject to
[
Γt
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)
− µGt
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)]
kH,rt+1
1+Rk,Ht+1
1+Ret+1
= kH,rt+1 − 1 .
The ﬁrst order conditions of the contracting problem yield the following relationship between the
leverage ratio,
Q
k¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1
NH,rt+1
, and the expected discounted return to capital (see Bernanke et al., 1999 for
details):
Et
(
1 +Rk,Ht+1
)
1 +Ret+1
= Ψ
(
Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1
NH,rt+1
)
,
where Ψ
′
> 0 for NH,rt+1 < Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1 . The ratio
Et(1+Rk,Ht+1 )
1+Ret+1
, which Bernanke et al. (1999) interpreted as
the external ﬁnance premium faced by entrepreneur, depends positively on the entrepreneur's leverage
ratio. Intuitively, all else equal, lower leverage means lower exposure, implying a lower probability of
default, hence a lower credit risk, which the bank translates into a lower required return on lending.
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Entrepreneurial net worth
After the loan contract received in t− 1 is settled, the entrepreneurial equity, V H,rt , is given by
V H,rt =
(
1 +Rk,Ht
)
Qk¯′,t−1K¯
H,r
t −1 +Ret + µ
´ ω¯H,rt
0
ωH,rdFt−1
(
ωH,r
) (
1 +Rk,Ht
)
Qk¯′,t−1K¯
H,r
t
Qk¯′,t−1K¯
H,r
t −NH,rt
(Qk¯′,t−1K¯H,rt −NH,rt ) .
Equity depends on the proﬁts accumulated from the entrepreneur's activities. The ﬁrst term represents
the proceeds from selling undepreciated capital to capital producers, plus the rental income of capital,
net of the costs of utilization (see equation A.6). The term in squared brackets represents the gross
rate of return paid by entrepreneur on time-(t− 1) loans.
At this point, to ensure that entrepreneur does not accumulate enough net worth to be fully self-
ﬁnanced, CMR assume that there is a constant probability of death. Namely, in each period en-
trepreneur exits the economy with probability 1− γH . In this case, entrepreneur rebates his equity to
households in a lump-sum way:
transfer to households =
(
1− γH)V H,rt .
To keep the population constant, 1− γH entrepreneurs are born each period.
Entrepreneurial net worth, NH,rt+1 , combines the total equity and a transfer received from households,
W e,H,rt , and is given by
NH,rt+1 = γ
HV Ht +W
e,H,r
t .
A feature of the debt contract is that entrepreneurs with no net worth receive no loans. Thus, if
newborn entrepreneurs receive no transfers, they would have zero net worth and would therefore not
be able to purchase any capital. The same happens with the fraction of entrepreneurs who are bankrupt
due to a low realization of ω. To avoid this situation, the 1− γH entrepreneurs who are born and the
γH who survive receive the subsidy W e,H,rt from households.
Households
There is a continuum of inﬁnitely lived risk averse households, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Each household
consumes, supplies a diﬀerentiated labor input and allocates his savings between riskless time deposit
and corporate bonds. As households diﬀer in hours worked and in income, one would expect that they
would also diﬀer in consumption and asset allocations. However, each household j is assumed to hold
state-contingent securities that provide insurance against household-speciﬁc wage-income risk. As a
result, households are homogeneous with respect to consumption and asset holdings in equilibrium.
Therefore, in what follows, consumption and saving decisions are not indexed by j.25
25 See Erceg et al. (2000) for a discussion about the existence of state-contingent securities.
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Consumption and saving decisions
The instantaneous utility function of a given household is separable in consumption and hours worked
and given by:
u (·) = log (Ct+τ − bCt+τ−1)− ψL
h1+σLj,t+τ
1 + σL
, (A.9)
where Ct denotes the household consumption at time t and hj,t denotes its hours worked in period t.
The parameter b > 0 measures the degree of external habit formation in consumption, σL > 0 is the
inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and ψL > 0 is a preference parameter that aﬀects the
disutility of supplying labor.
At the end of period t, household allocates his savings into time deposits, Tt, and corporate bonds,
CBt. At the end of period t + 1, time deposits pay a riskless rate of return equal to R
e
t+1, while the
rate of return on corporate bonds is RFt+1. We assume that both rates are known when household
makes his saving decision and are not contingent on the realization of period-(t+ 1) monetary policy
shock.
The household budget constraint at time t, written in nominal terms, is given by
(1 +Ret )Tt−1 +
(
1 +RFt
)
CBt−1 +Wj,thj,t
+
(
1− γL) [1− Ω (Rcoupon,at −Rcoupont )] (1− η)V L,lt + (1− γH) ηV H,rt
+ΠIGFt + Π
IB
t +NCSt − CBt − Tt − PtCt −W et − Lumpt ≥ 0 ,
where Wj,t is the wage earned by the household j, NCSj,t represents the net payoﬀ of the state
contingent securities that the jth household purchases to insulate itself from the uncertainty associated
with the ability to re-optimize its wage, ΠIGFt and Π
IB
t are the proﬁts received from, respectively,
intermediate-good ﬁrms and investment banks,
(
1− γH) ηV H,rt are the lump-sum transfers received
from riskier entrepreneurs who exit the economy,
(
1− γL) [1− Ω (Rcoupon,at −Rcoupont )] (1− η)V L,lt
are the lump-sum transfers (net of side payments) received from safer entrepreneurs who exit the
economy, W et is the total transfer payment to entrepreneurs and Lumpt are lump-sum taxes paid to
ﬁnance government expenditures.
The representative household takes its consumption and saving decisions so as to maximize the expected
lifetime utility subject to its intertemporal budget constraint. The optimization problem is given by
max
{Ct+τ ,Tt+τ ,CBt+τ}
Et
∞∑
τ=0
βτ
[
log (Ct+τ − bCt+τ−1)− ψL
h1+σLj,t+τ
1 + σL
]
subject to
(
1 +Ret+τ
)
Tt−1+τ +
(
1 +RFt+τ
)
CBt−1+τ +Wj,t+τhj,t+τ
+
(
1− γL) [1− Ω (Rcoupon,at+τ −Rcoupont+τ )]V Lt+τ + (1− γH)V Ht+τ
+ΠIGFt+τ + Π
IB
t+τ +NCSt+τ − CBt+τ − Tt+τ
−Pt+τCt+τ −W et+τ − Lumpt+τ ≥ 0 .
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The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to Tt, CBt and Ct are, respectively,
λt = β
(
1 +Ret+1
)
Et (λt+1) (A.10)
λt = β
(
1 +RFt+1
)
Et (λt+1) (A.11)
Ptλt =
1
(Ct − bCt−1) − βb
1
(Ct+1 − bCt) , (A.12)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the households' budget constraint. Equation (A.10)
represents the standard Euler equation. The right hand side of (A.12) is the marginal utility of
consumption, taking into account habit persistence. Comparing (A.10) and (A.11), it must hold that
RFt+1 = R
e
t+1 ∀t, i.e. the return on corporate bonds equals the return on time deposits, which in turn is
equal to the central bank nominal interest rate. This result is due to the assumption that both interest
rates are known when household makes his optimal decision and are not contingent on the realization
of period-(t+ 1) monetary policy shock.
Labor supply and wage setting
Each household is a monopolistic supplier of a diﬀerentiated labor service, hj,t, to the production
sector. Labor services are bundled together using the aggregator function
Li,t =
[ˆ 1
0
(hj,t)
1
λw dj
]λw
, (A.13)
where λw, ∞ > λw ≥ 1, represents the wage markup. The demand curve for the jth household
specialized labor services is
hj,t =
(
Wj,t
Wt
) λw
1−λw
Li,t ,
and the aggregate nominal wage, Wt, is given by
Wt =
[ˆ 1
o
(Wj,t)
1
1−λw dj
]1−λw
. (A.14)
In each period, a fraction ξw of households cannot reoptimize their wages and, therefore, set their
wages according to the indexation rule
Wj,t = Wj,t−1 (p¯i)
ιw1 (pit−1)
1−ιw1 ,
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where iw1, 0 ≤ ιw1 ≤ 1, represents the degree of wage indexation to steady state inﬂation rate. The
fraction 1− ξw of reoptimizing households set their wages by maximizing
max
Wj,t
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βξw)
τ
[
−ψL
h1+σLj,t+τ
1 + σL
+ λt+τWj,t+τhj,t+τ
]
subject to hj,t =
(
Wj,t
Wt
) λw
1−λw
Li,t .
We only consider the symmetric equilibrium in which all households choose the same W˜t = Wj,t. Thus,
given (A.14), the law of motion of the aggregate wage index is given by
Wt =
{
(1− ξw) W˜
1
1−λw
t + ξw
[
Wt−1 (p¯i)
ιw1 (pit−1)
1−ιw1
] 1
1−λw
}1−λw
.
Resource constraint
The aggregate resource constraint is
Ct + It +GCt + ηµ
´ ω¯t
0
ωdF (ω)
(
1 +Rk,Ht
)
Q
k¯′,t−1K¯
H,r
t
Pt
+UCt + ηa
(
uH,rt
)
K¯H,rt + (1− η) a
(
uL,lt
)
K¯L,lt = Yt .
Government expenditures, GCt, are determined exogenously as a constant fraction, ηg, of ﬁnal output:
GCt = ηgYt and are ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes to the households. The fourth term represents ﬁnal
output used by banks in monitoring riskier entrepreneurs, and UCt = Ω (R
coupon,a
t −Rcoupont ) (1− η)V L,lt
represents the underwriter's consumption in period t. Finally, the last two terms on the left hand side
capture capital utilization costs.
Aggregate variables and market clearing conditions
Aggregate net worth (NTOTt+1 ) and aggregate leverage (lev
TOT
t+1 ) are deﬁned, respectively, as
NTOTt+1 = ηN
H,r
t+1 + (1− η)NL,lt+1
levTOTt+1 = ηlev
H,r
t+1 + (1− η) levL,lt+1 = η
Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1
NH,rt+1
+ (1− η) Qk¯′,tK¯
L,l
t+1
NL,lt+1
.
Total credit (BTOTt+1 ) is deﬁned as the sum of bank loans and bonds issued and is given by:
BTOTt+1 = ηB
H,r
t+1 + (1− η)BIL,lt+1 .
32
The capital rental market clearing conditions are:
ˆ 1
0
KHi,tdi = K
H
t = ηK
H,r
t = ηu
H,r
t K¯
H,r
t
and ˆ 1
0
KLi,tdi = K
L
t = (1− η)KL,lt = (1− η)uL,lt K¯L,lt .
Loan and bond market clearing conditions are, respectively, Tt = ηB
H,r
t+1 and CBt = (1− η)BIL,lt+1.
The market clearing condition in the labor market is: Lt =
´ 1
0
{[´ 1
0
(hj,t)
1
λw dj
]λw}
di.
Finally, the total transfer from households (W et ) to entrepreneurs must satisfy
W et = ηW
e,H,r
t + (1− η)W e,L,lt .
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Appendix B - Technical details
Final-good ﬁrms
The maximization problem solved by the representative ﬁnal-good ﬁrm is the following:
max
Yi,t
ΠFGFt = PtYt −
ˆ 1
0
Pi,tYi,tdi
subject to Yt =
[ˆ 1
0
Y
1
λf
i,t di
]λf
.
The ﬁrst order condition is:
∂ΠFGFt
∂Yi,t
= 0⇔ Ptλf
[ˆ 1
0
Y
1
λf
i,t di
]λf−1
1
λf
Y
1
λf
−1
i,t − Pi,t = 0 .
A simple algebra shows that the demand function for the intermediate good i is given by
Yi,t =
(
Pi,t
Pt
) λf
1−λf
Yt . (B.1)
Substituting (B.1) into the expression for ΠFGFt yields
ΠFGFt = PtYt −
ˆ 1
0
Pi,t
(
Pi,t
Pt
) λf
1−λf
Ytdi . (B.2)
Perfect competition in the ﬁnal-good market implies that ΠFGFt = 0. Imposing this condition in (B.2)
gives the following expression for the price of the ﬁnal good:
Pt =
[ˆ 1
0
P
1
1−λf
i,t di
]1−λf
. (B.3)
Intermediate-good ﬁrms
Cost minimization problem
The i-th ﬁrm's cost minimization problem, in real terms, is given by
min
{Li,t,KHi,t,KLi,t}
C (·) = WtLi,tPt +KHi,tr
k,H
t +K
L
i,tr
k,L
t (B.4)
subject to Yi,t = (Ki,t)
α
(Li,t)
1−α
(B.5)
Ki,t =
[
η1−ρ
(
KHi,t
)ρ
+ (1− η)1−ρ (KLi,t)ρ] 1ρ . (B.6)
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Solving (B.5) for Lt and using (B.6), the minimization problem may be rewritten as
min
{KHi,t,KLi,t}
C (·) = WtPt (Yi,t)
1
1−α
[
η1−ρ
(
KHi,t
)ρ
+ (1− η)1−ρ (KLi,t)ρ]− αρ(1−α)
+KHi,tr
k,H
t +K
L
i,tr
k,L
t .
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to KHi,t and K
L
i,t are, respectively,
rk,Ht =
Wt
Pt
(Yi,t)
1
1−α α
1− αη
1−ρ
[
η1−ρ
(
KHi,t
)ρ
+ (1− η)1−ρ (KLi,t)ρ]− αρ(1−α)−1 (KHi,t)ρ−1 (B.7)
rk,Lt =
Wt
Pt
(Yi,t)
1
1−α α
1− α (1− η)
1−ρ
[
η1−ρ
(
KHi,t
)ρ
+ (1− η)1−ρ (KLi,t)ρ]− αρ(1−α)−1 (KLi,t)ρ−1 .(B.8)
Taking the ratio of (B.7) and (B.8), the following arbitrage condition for the choice of capital services
may be derived:
rk,Ht
rk,Lt
=
(
η
1− η
)1−ρ(KHi,t
KLi,t
)ρ−1
. (B.9)
Since
KHi,t = ηK
H,r
i,t = η
(
uH,rt K¯
H,r
i,t
)
, (B.10)
then the arbitrage condition may be rewritten in terms of entrepreneur-speciﬁc capital services as
rk,Ht
rk,Lt
=
(
uH,rt K¯
H,r
i,t
uL,lt K¯
L,l
i,t
)ρ−1
.
From (B.7) we can derive the following expression for Ki,t:
Ki,t =
[
Wt
Pt
1
rk,Ht
α
1− αη
1−ρ (KHi,t)ρ−1
] 1−α
ρ+α(1−ρ)
(Yi,t)
1
ρ+α(1−ρ) . (B.11)
Now compute rk,Lt from (B.9) andK
L
i,t from (B.6). Using these results and equation (B.11) to substitute
in (B.4), it takes a few steps to obtain the following expression for the cost function C (·):
C (·) =
[
Wt
Pt
1
1− α
]1− α
ρ+α(1−ρ)
[
αη1−ρ
rk,Ht
(
KHi,t
)ρ−1]− αρ+α(1−ρ)
(Yi,t)
ρ
ρ+α(1−ρ) .
Real marginal costs are thus given by
si,t =
∂C (·)
∂Yi,t
=
[
Wt
Pt
1
1− α
]1− α
ρ+α(1−ρ)
[
αη1−ρ
rk,Ht
(
KHi,t
)ρ−1]− αρ+α(1−ρ)
(Yi,t)
α(ρ−1)
ρ+α(1−ρ) ρ
ρ+ α (1− ρ) .
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Eﬃcient input choice by ﬁrm i also implies that real marginal costs must be equal to the cost of renting
one unit of capital divided by the marginal product of capital (∂Y/∂K). Since
∂Yi,t
∂KHi,t
= α
(
Li,t
Ki,t
)1−α
η1−ρ
(
KHi,t
)ρ−1 [
η1−ρ
(
KHi,t
)ρ
+ (1− η)1−ρ (KLi,t)ρ] 1ρ−1
and
∂Yi,t
∂KLi,t
= α
(
Li,t
Ki,t
)1−α
(1− η)1−ρ (KLi,t)ρ−1 [η1−ρ (KHi,t)ρ + (1− η)1−ρ (KLi,t)ρ] 1ρ−1 ,
then
si,t =
rk,Ht
∂Yi,t
∂KHi,t
=
rk,Lt
∂Yi,t
∂KLi,t
.
Since all ﬁrms i face the same input prices and since they all have access to the same production
technology, real marginal costs si,t are identical across ﬁrms, i.e., si,t = st with
st =
[
Wt
Pt
1
1− α
]1− α
ρ+α(1−ρ)
[
αη1−ρ
rk,Ht
(
KHt
)ρ−1]− αρ+α(1−ρ)
(Yt)
α(ρ−1)
ρ+α(1−ρ) ρ
ρ+ α (1− ρ) ,
or, using equation (B.10),
st =
[
Wt
Pt
1
1− α
]1− α
ρ+α(1−ρ)
[
α
rk,Ht
(
KH,rt
)ρ−1]− αρ+α(1−ρ)
(Yt)
α(ρ−1)
ρ+α(1−ρ) ρ
ρ+ α (1− ρ) .
Price setting
Every ﬁrm faces a constant probability, 1−ξp, of reoptimizing its price in any given period, whereas the
non-reoptimizing ﬁrms set their prices according to the indexation rule Pi,t = Pi,t−1 (p¯i)
ι1 (pit−1)
1−ι1 .
The i-th ﬁrm that optimizes its price at time t chooses Pi,t = P˜i,t that maximizes the present value of
future expected nominal proﬁts. The maximization problem is given by:
max
Pi,t
ΠIGFt = Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βξp)
τ
λt+τ [(Pi,t+τ − St+τ )Yi,t+τ ]
subject to Yi,t+τ =
(
Pi,t+τ
Pt+τ
) λf
1−λf
Yt+τ .
Substituting the demand function and rearranging yields
max
Pi,t
ΠIGFt = Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βξp)
τ
λt+τYt+τPt+τ
(Pi,t+τ
Pt+τ
)1+ λf1−λf − st+τ (Pi,t+τ
Pt+τ
) λf
1−λf
 . (B.12)
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We make use of the following deﬁnitions:
p˜t+τ =
P˜t+τ
Pt+τ
, pi,t+τ =
Pi,t+τ
Pt+τ
, λn,t+τ = λt+τPt+τ .
Then
Pi,t+τ
Pt+τ
=
p˜it+τ . . . p˜it+1P˜t
pit+τ . . . pit+1Pt
= Xt,τ p˜t , (B.13)
where
Xt,τ =

p˜it+τ ...p˜it+1
pit+τ ...pit+1
τ > 0
1 τ = 0
and p˜it+τ = (p¯i)
ι1 (pit+τ−1)
1−ι1 . Using (B.13) to substitute out Pi,t+τPt+τ in (B.12), then the proﬁt maxi-
mization problem may be rewritten as
max
p˜t
ΠIGFt = Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βξp)
τ
Jt+τ
[
Xt,τ (p˜t)
1+
λf
1−λf − st+τ (p˜t)
λf
1−λf
]
,
where Jt+τ = λn,t+τYt+τ (Xt,τ )
λf
1−λf is exogenous from the point of view of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrst order
condition is
∂ΠIGFt
∂p˜t
= 0⇔ Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βξp)
τ Jt+τ
1− λf (p˜t)
λf
1−λf −1 [Xt,τ p˜t − λfst+τ ] = 0 .
After rearranging, the ﬁrst order condition becomes
p˜t =
Et
∑∞
τ=0 (βξp)
τ
Jt+τλfst+τ
Et
∑∞
τ=0 (βξp)
τ
Jt+τXt,τ
=
Kp,t
Fp,t
. (B.14)
For computational tractability, it is crucial to write the inﬁnite sums, Kp,t and Fp,t, in a recursive
representations. After some manipulations, one can show that
Kp,t = λn,tYtλfst + βξp
(
pi1−ι1t
pit+1
)− λfλf−1
Kp,t+1
and
Fp,t = λn,tYt + βξp
(
pi1−ι1t
pit+1
) 1
1−λf
Fp,t+1 .
Note that, when prices are fully ﬂexible (ξp = 0), then Kp,t = Fp,t and st = 1/λf , that is, the real
marginal cost is the reciprocal of the markup.
We have derived the optimum price from the ﬁrm's ﬁrst order condition. We now identify a consistency
condition that must hold across all ﬁrm prices, which allows us to express p˜t in terms of aggregate
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variables only. Expanding (B.3) yields
Pt =
[ˆ 1
0
P
1
1−λf
i,t di
]1−λf
=
[ˆ
1−ξp
(Pi,t)
1
1−λf +
ˆ
ξp
(Pi,t)
1
1−λf
]1−λf
.
Regarding the limits of integration, 1− ξp refers to the ﬁrms that reoptimize prices in period t, while
ξp refers to the ﬁrms that do not. Making use of the fact that whether ﬁrms are selected to reoptimize
or not is determined randomly, we can rewrite the previous expression as follows:
Pt =
{
(1− ξp) P˜
1
1−λf
t + ξp [Pt−1p˜it]
1
1−λf
}1−λf
.
Dividing both sides by Pt, it takes a few step to obtain
p˜t =
1− ξp
(
p˜it
pit
) 1
1−λf
1− ξp

1−λf
. (B.15)
Finally, combining (B.15) with (B.14) we obtain
Kp,t
Fp,t
=
1− ξp
(
p˜it
pit
) 1
1−λf
1− ξp

1−λf
.
This expression relates the inﬂation rate to aggregate variables only.
Households
The wage decision
Each household j supplies a diﬀerentiated labor input to the production sector. Following Erceg
et al. (2000), we assume that there is a representative employment agency that combines households'
specialized labor, hj,t, into homogeneous labor employed by ﬁrm i, Li,t, using the following constant
returns to scale technology:
Li,t =
[ˆ 1
0
(hj,t)
1
λw dj
]λw
,
where ∞ > λw ≥ 1 represents the wage markup. The representative employment agency hires hj,t in
order to maximize its time-t proﬁts:
max
hj,t
WtLi,t −
ˆ 1
0
Wj,thj,tdj
subject to Li,t =
[ˆ 1
0
(hj,t)
1
λw dj
]λw
.
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The ﬁrst order condition leads to the following demand curve for the jth household specialized labor
services:
hj,t =
(
Wj,t
Wt
) λw
1−λw
Li,t .
Zero proﬁt condition for the perfectly competitive employment agencies gives the following relation
between the aggregate nominal wage and the wage earned by the household j:
Wt =
[ˆ 1
o
(Wj,t)
1
1−λw dj
]1−λw
. (B.16)
In each period, a fraction ξw of households cannot reoptimize their wages and, by assumption, set
their wages according to the indexation rule Wj,t = Wj,t−1 (p¯i)
ιw1 (pit−1)
1−ιw1 . The fraction 1− ξw of
reoptimizing households set their wages solving the following problem
max
Wj,t
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βξw)
τ
[
−ψL
h1+σLj,t+τ
1 + σL
+ λt+τWj,t+τhj,t+τ
]
subject to hj,t+τ =
(
Wj,t+τ
Wt+τ
) λw
1−λw
Li,t+τ .
Substituting out for hj,t using the labor demand curve yields:
max
Wj,t
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βξw)
τ
− ψL1 + σL
[(
Wj,t+τ
Wt+τ
) λw
1−λw
Li,t+τ
]1+σL
+ λt+τWj,t+τ
(
Wj,t+τ
Wt+τ
) λw
1−λw
Li,t+τ
 .
This equation can be rewritten as:
max
Wj,t
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βξw)
τ
− ψL1 + σL
[(
Wj,t+τ
Wt+τ
) λw
1−λw
Li,t+τ
]1+σL
+λt+τ
Pt+τ
Pt+τ
Wj,t+τ
Wt+τ
Wj,t+τ
(
Wj,t+τ
Wt+τ
) λw
1−λw +1
Li,t+τ
}
. (B.17)
We adopt the following deﬁnitions:
Wj,t+τ = W˜t+τ , w˜t+τ =
Wt+τ
Pt+τ
, wt+τ =
W˜t+τ
Wt+τ
,
λn,t+τ = λt+τPt+τ , w˜t+τwt+τ =
W˜t+τ
Pt+τ
.
Then
Wj,t+τ
Wt+τ
= Xt,τ
w˜twt
w˜t+τ
, (B.18)
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where
Xt,τ =

p˜iw,t+τ ...p˜iw,t+1
pit+τ ...pit+1
τ > 0
1 τ = 0
and p˜iw,t+τ = (p¯i)
ιw1 (pit+τ−1)
1−ιw1 . Substituting (B.18) in (B.17), we obtain
max
Wj,t
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βξw)
τ
− ψL1 + σL
[(
Xt,τ
w˜twt
w˜t+τ
) λw
1−λw
Li,t+τ
]1+σL
+λn,t+τ w˜t+τLi,t+τ
(
Xt,τ
w˜twt
w˜t+τ
) λw
1−λw +1
}
. (B.19)
Maximizing (B.19) with respect to wt yields
26
Et
∑∞
τ=0 (βξw)
τ
{
−ψL
[(
Xt,τ
w˜twt
w˜t+τ
) λw
1−λw
Li,t+τ
]σL
λw
1−λwLi,t+τ
(
Xt,τ
w˜twt
w˜t+τ
) λw
1−λw−1
Xt,τ
w˜t
w˜t+τ
+λn,t+τ w˜t+τLi,t+τ
1
1−λw
(
Xt,τ
w˜twt
w˜t+τ
) λw
1−λw
Xt,τ
w˜t
w˜t+τ
}
= 0 .
or, after rearranging,
Et
∑∞
τ=0 (βξw)
τ
Li,t+τ
(
Xt,τ
w˜t
w˜t+τ
) λw
1−λw λw
1−λww
λw
1−λw−1
t
{
−ψL
[(
Xt,τ
w˜twt
w˜t+τ
) λw
1−λw
Li,t+τ
]σL
+λn,t+τ
w˜twt
λw
Xt,τ
}
= 0 .
Multiplying this expression by w
−λwσL1−λw
t we obtain, after some manipulations,
Et
∑∞
τ=0 (βξw)
τ
Li,t+τ
(
Xt,τ
w˜t
w˜t+τ
) λw
1−λw
λn,t+τ
w˜t
λw
w
1−λw(1+σL)
1−λw
t Xt,τ =
(B.20)
Et
∑∞
τ=0 (βξw)
τ
L1+σLi,t+τ
(
Xt,τ
w˜t
w˜t+τ
)λw(1+σL)
1−λw
ψL .
Equation (B.20) can be rewritten as
Fw,tw˜tw
1−λw(1+σL)
1−λw
t = ψLKw,t ,
where
Kw,t = Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βξw)
τ
L1+σLi,t+τ
(
Xt,τ
w˜t
w˜t+τ
)λw(1+σL)
1−λw
26 Whether the household chooses wt or W˜t = Wj,t makes no diﬀerence, since wt is W˜t scaled by a variable over which
the household has no control.
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and
Fw,t = Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βξw)
τ
Li,t+τ
(
Xt,τ
w˜t
w˜t+τ
) λw
1−λw
λn,t+τ
Xt,τ
λw
.
Therefore the optimal wage rate results
wt =
[
ψL
w˜t
Kw,t
Fw,t
] λw−1
λw(1+σL)−1
. (B.21)
We have derived the wage rate from the household's ﬁrst order condition. We now derive an expression
for the aggregate real wage, w˜t, just in terms of aggregate variables.
Expanding equation (B.16) yields
Wt =
[ˆ 1
o
(Wj,t)
1
1−λw dj
]1−λw
=
[ˆ
1−ξw
(Wj,t)
1
1−λw +
ˆ
ξw
(Wj,t)
1
1−λw
]1−λw
.
Regarding the limits of integration, 1− ξw refers to the households that reoptimize in period t, while
ξw refers to the households that do not. Making use of the fact that whether households are selected
to optimize or not is determined randomly, we can rewrite the previous expression as follows:
Wt =
[
(1− ξw)
(
W˜t
) 1
1−λw
+ ξw (Wt−1p˜iw,t)
1
1−λw
]1−λw
.
After dividing both sides by Wt, it takes few steps to obtain
wt =
1− ξw
(
p˜iw,t
piw,t
) 1
1−λw
1− ξw

1−λw
, (B.22)
where piw,t = Wt/Wt−1 = pitw˜t/w˜t−1. Equating expressions (B.21) and (B.22) yields
Kw,t =
Fw,tw˜t
ψL
1− ξw
(
p˜iw,t
piw,t
) 1
1−λw
1− ξw

λw(1+σL)−1
.
This expression relates the real wage to aggregate variables only. Note that, when wages are fully
ﬂexible (ξw = 0), the last expression becomes
w˜t = λw
ψLL
σL
t
λn,t
,
that is, the real wage in units of the consumption good, w˜t, is a markup, λw, over the household's
marginal cost of leisure, ψLL
σL
t /λn,t, also expressed in terms of the consumption good.
For computational tractability, it is crucial to write the inﬁnite sums, Kw,t and Fw,t, in a recursive
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representations. After some manipulations, one can show that
Kw,t = h
1+σL
t + βξw
[
pi1−ιw1t
pit+1
w˜t+1
w˜t
]λw(1+σL)
1−λw
Kw,t+1
and
Fw,t = ht
λn,t
λw
+ βξw
(
1
pit+1
w˜t+1
w˜t
) λw
1−λw (pi1−ιw1t ) 11−λw
pit+1
Fw,t+1 .
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Appendix C - Model solution
This appendix reports the details on how we solved the model. The solution strategy involves lin-
earization around the model's nonstochastic steady state. We ﬁrst solve numerically the model, for
the steady state, using the computational procedure described later in this appendix. We then employ
the Dynare software package to compute the ﬁrst-order Taylor series approximation of the equilibrium
conditions in the neighborhood of the steady state.
In what follows, we adopt the following scaling notation:
qt =
Qk¯′
Pt
, λn,t = λtPt , w
e,L,l
t =
W e,L,lt
Pt
, we,H,rt =
W e,H,rt
Pt
,
nH,rt+1 =
NH,rt+1
Pt
, nL,lt+1 =
NL,lt+1
Pt
.
The equations that characterize the model's equilibrium, expressed in scaled form, are listed below.
• Investment bank
 coupon rate (constant markup over the nominal interest rate)
1 +Rcoupon,at+1 =
εcoupon,a
εcoupon,a − 1
(
1 +Ret+1
)
(C.1)
 law of motion for optimism
χt = ρχχt−1 + (1− ρχ)α3
(
nL,lt+1 − nL,l
)
(C.2)
 coupon interest rate elasticity (with optimism)
εcoupon,biasedt+1 = ε
coupon,a (1 + χt) (C.3)
 coupon rate (with optimism)
1 +Rcoupon,biasedt+1 =
εcoupon,biasedt+1
εcoupon,biasedt+1 − 1
(
1 +Ret+1
)
(C.4)
 coupon interest rate elasticity (with optimism and side payments)
εcoupont+1 = ε
coupon,a (1 + r2χt) (C.5)
 coupon rate (with optimism and side payments)
1 +Rcoupont+1 =
εcoupont+1
εcoupont+1 − 1
(
1 +Ret+1
)
(C.6)
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• Intermediate-good ﬁrms
 arbitrage condition for the choice of capital services
rk,Ht
rk,Lt
=
(
uH,rt K¯
H,r
t
uL,lt K¯
L,l
t
)ρ−1
(C.7)
 two measure of marginal costs
st =
ρ
ρ+ α (1− ρ)
[
w˜t
1− α
]1− α
ρ+α(1−ρ)
[
α
rk,Ht
(
uH,rt K¯
H,r
t
)ρ−1]− αρ+α(1−ρ)
(Yt)
α(ρ−1)
ρ+α(1−ρ) (C.8)
st =
rk,Ht
α
(
ht
Kt
)1−α (
uH,rt K¯
H,r
t
)ρ−1 [
η
(
uH,rt K¯
H,r
t
)ρ
+ (1− η)
(
uL,lt K¯
L,l
t
)ρ] 1ρ−1 (C.9)
where
Kt =
[
η
(
uH,rt K¯
H,r
t
)ρ
+ (1− η)
(
uL,lt K¯
L,l
t
)ρ] 1ρ
(C.10)
• Capital producers
 ﬁrst order condition with respect to investment
λn,tqt
[
1− S
′′
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
− S′′ It
It−1
(
It
It−1
− 1
)]
− λn,t
+βλn,t+1qt+1S
′′
(
It+1
It
)2(
It+1
It
− 1
)
= 0 (C.11)
 law of motion for aggregate stock of physical capital
ηK¯H,rt+1 + (1− η) K¯L,lt+1 = (1− δ)
[
ηK¯H,rt + (1− η) K¯L,lt
]
+
[
1− S
′′
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2]
It (C.12)
• Riskier entrepreneur and retail bank
 ﬁrst order condition with respect to capital utilization
rk,Ht = a
′ (
uH,rt
)
(C.13)
 deﬁnition of rate of return on capital
1 +Rk,Ht =
pit
qt−1
{[
uH,rt r
k,H
t − a
(
uH,rt
)]
+ (1− δ) qt
}
(C.14)
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 standard debt contract
Et
{
[1− Γt (ω¯t+1)]
1 +Rk,Ht+1
1 +Ret+1
+
Γ
′
t (ω¯t+1)
Γ
′
t (ω¯t+1)− µG′t (ω¯t+1)
[
[Γt (ω¯t+1)− µGt (ω¯t+1)]
1 +Rk,Ht+1
1 +Ret+1
− 1
]}
= 0 (C.15)
 zero proﬁt condition for bank
[Γt (ω¯t)− µGt (ω¯t)] qt−1K¯
H,r
t
nH,rt
1 +Rk,Ht
1 +Ret
=
qt−1K¯
H,r
t
nH,rt
− 1 (C.16)
 law of motion for net worth
nH,rt+1 = γ
H qt−1
pit
K¯H,rt
[
Rk,Ht −Ret − µ
ˆ ω¯t
0
ωdFt−1 (ω)
(
1 +Rk,Ht
)]
+γH
nH,rt
pit
(1 +Ret ) + w
e,H,r
t (C.17)
• Safer entrepreneur
 ﬁrst order condition with respect to capital utilization
rk,Lt = a
′ (
uL,lt
)
(C.18)
 deﬁnition of rate of return on capital
1 +Rk,Lt =
pit
qt−1
{[
uL,lt r
k,L
t − a
(
uL,lt
)]
+ (1− δ) qt
}
(C.19)
 ﬁrst order condition with respect to capital (using the deﬁnition of rate of return on capital)
Rcoupont+1 −Rk,Lt+1 − 1 +
1
β
= 0 (C.20)
 law of motion for net worth
nL,lt+1 = γ
L [1− Ω (Rcoupon,at −Rcoupont )]
qt−1
pit
K¯L,lt
(
Rk,Lt −Rcoupont
)
+ [1− Ω (Rcoupon,at −Rcoupont )]
γL
pit
(1 +Rcoupont )n
L,l
t + w
e,L,l
t (C.21)
• Households
 ﬁrst order condition with respect to time deposits
λn,t =
β
pit+1
(
1 +Ret+1
)
λn,t+1 (C.22)
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 ﬁrst order condition with respect to consumption
λn,t =
1
(Ct − bCt−1) − βb
1
(Ct+1 − bCt) (C.23)
• Aggregate resource constraint and production function
Ct + It + η
[
µ
´ ω¯t
0
ωdF (ω)
(
1 +Rk,Ht
)
qt−1K¯
H,r
t
pit
]
+ UCt
+ηa
(
uH,rt
)
K¯H,rt + (1− η) a
(
uL,lt
)
K¯L,lt = (1− ηg)Yt (C.24)
Yt = K
α
t h
1−α
t (C.25)
• Conditions associated with Calvo sticky prices and wages
λn,tYt + βξp
(
pi1−ι1t
pit+1
) 1
1−λf
Fp,t+1 − Fp,t = 0 (C.26)
λn,tYtλfst + βξp
(
pi1−ι1t
pit+1
)− λfλf−1
Kp,t+1 −Kp,t = 0 (C.27)
ht
λn,t
λw
+ βξw
(
1
pit+1
wt+1
wt
) λw
1−λw (pi1−ιw1t ) 11−λw
pit+1
Fw,t+1 − Fw,t = 0 (C.28)
h1+σLt + βξw
[
pi1−ιw1t
pit+1
wt+1
wt
]λw(1+σL)
1−λw
Kw,t+1 −Kw,t = 0 (C.29)
Kp,t = Fp,t

1− ξp
(
pi
1−ι1
t−1
pit
) 1
1−λf
1− ξp

1−λf
(C.30)
Kw,t = Fw,t
w˜t
ψL

1− ξw
[
pi
1−ιw1
t−1
pit
wt
wt−1
] 1
1−λw
1− ξw

1−λw(1+σL)
(C.31)
• Other variables
 External ﬁnance premium
P et = ω¯t+1
(
1 +Rk,Ht+1
) qtK¯H,rt+1
qtK¯
H,r
t+1 − nH,rt+1
− (1 +Ret+1) (C.32)
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 Contractual, no-default interest rate on entrepreneurial debt
Zt = ω¯t+1
(
1 +Rk,Ht+1
) qtK¯H,rt+1
qtK¯
H,r
t+1 − nH,rt+1
(C.33)
 Aggregate net worth
nTOTt+1 = ηn
H,r
t+1 + (1− η)nL,lt+1 (C.34)
 Bond amount
BIL,lt+1 = qtK¯
L,l
t+1 − nL,lt+1 (C.35)
 Bank loans
BH,rt+1 = qtK¯
H,r
t+1 − nH,rt+1 (C.36)
 Safer entrepreneur's leverage
levL,lt+1 =
qtK¯
L,l
t+1
nL,lt+1
(C.37)
 Riskier entrepreneur's leverage
levH,rt+1 =
qtK¯
H,r
t+1
nH,rt+1
(C.38)
 Aggregate leverage
levTOTt+1 = ηlev
H,r
t+1 + (1− η) levL,lt+1 (C.39)
 Total credit (bank loans + bonds)
BTOTt+1 = ηB
H,r
t+1 + (1− η)BIL,lt+1 (C.40)
• Monetary policy rule
Ret =
(
Ret−1
)ρ˜ [
Re
(
Etpit+1
p¯i
)αpi (Yt
Y¯
)αy](1−ρ˜)
εMPt (C.41)
Steady state
The strategy used for computing the steady state in this model follows the approach used by Christiano
et al. (2003). We set one of the endogenous variables of the model to a value that seems reasonable
based on empirical evidence, making this variable exogenous in the steady state calculation. We then
move a model's exogenous variable into the list of variables that are endogenous in the steady state
calculation. This approach allows us to simplify the problem of computing the steady state.
We set the steady state rental rate of capital of the riskier entrepreneur, rk,H , to 0.0504, in line with
the value used by CMR, and we choose the parameter ψL in (A.9) as endogenous variable. The set of
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endogenous variables is:
pit , st , It , ω¯t , R
k,H
t , R
k,L
t , K¯
H,r
t , K¯
L,l
t , Kt , n
H,r
t , n
L,l
t , qt , λn,t , Ct , w˜t , ht ,
rk,Lt , R
e
t , Fp,t , Fw,t ,Kp,t , Kw,t , Yt , ψL , u
H,r
t , u
L,l
t ,
εcoupont , ε
coupon,biased
t , R
coupon
t , R
coupon,a
t , R
coupon,biased
t , χt ,
P extt , Zt , B
H,r
t , BI
L,l
t , B
TOT
t , lev
H,r
t , lev
L,l
t , lev
TOT
t , n
TOT
t ,
and the equations available for computing the steady state value for these variables are (C.1)-(C.41).
As in Woodford (2003), steady state inﬂation is set to zero, that is, p¯i = 1. By assumption, uH,r =
uL,l = 1 and χ = 0.
Solve for Re and q using (C.22) and (C.11). Use (C.5) and (C.3) to compute εcoupon and εcoupon,biased.
Solve for the steady state interest rates Rcoupon, Rcoupon,a and Rcoupon,biased using, respectively, (C.6),
(C.1) and (C.4). Take the ratio of (C.26) and (C.27) to obtain the value for s. Equations (C.20) and
(C.19) can be used to obtain Rk,L and rk,L.
Now we set rk,H = 0.0504 and solve for Rk,H using (C.14). Then solve the non-linear system composed
by equations (C.15)-(C.17) to obtain the values for nH,r, ω¯ and K¯H,r. From (C.7) we get the value
for K¯L,l. Solve for nL,l, K and I using (C.21), (C.10) and (C.12), respectively. Solve (C.9) for h and
then (C.25) for Y . Then use (C.8) and (C.24) to solve for w˜ and C. Get λn using (C.23). Equations
(C.26), (C.28) and (C.29) can be used to obtain Fp, Fw and Kw. It then follows from (C.30) that
Kp = Fp. Finally, solve for ψL using (C.31). The remaining variables are trivial functions of the
structural parameters and other steady state values and are computed using equations (C.32)-(C.40).
In these calculations, all variables must be positive, and
K¯H,r > nH,r > 0 ; K¯L,l > nL,l > 0 ; Z > Rcoupon .
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Appendix D - Calibration: threshold level for side payments (Ω¯)
In this appendix we deﬁne the threshold for Ω below which the entrepreneur would always be better
oﬀ when oﬀering side payments.
The entrepreneur has two options. He can:
1. issue bonds at the normal coupon rate Rcoupon,at+1 (equation 8);
2. oﬀer side payments and obtain a lower coupon rate (Rcoupon,biasedt+1 , in equation 11).
In the ﬁrst case, Rcoupont = R
coupon,a
t , so entrepreneur's equity and net worth are given by, respectively,
V L,l,at = revenues− (1 +Rcoupon,at )BIL,lt
NL,l,at+1 = γ
LV L,l,at +W
e,L,l
t ,
where revenues =
{[
uL,lt r
k,L
t − a
(
uL,lt
)]
Pt + (1− δ)Qk¯′,t
}
K¯L,lt and BI
L,l
t = Qk¯′,t−1K¯
L,l
t −NL,lt .
In the second case, Rcoupont = R
coupon,biased
t , so entrepreneur's equity and net worth are now given by,
respectively,
V L,l,bt = revenues−
(
1 +Rcoupon,biasedt
)
BIL,lt
NL,l,bt+1 = γ
L
[
1− Ω
(
Rcoupon,at −Rcoupon,biasedt
)]
V L,l,bt +W
e,L,l
t .
The entrepreneur is therefore better oﬀ oﬀering side payments whenever
NL,l,bt+1 ≥ NL,l,at+1
⇔
[
1− Ω
(
Rcoupon,at −Rcoupon,biasedt
)]
V L,l,bt ≥ V L,l,at
⇔ V L,l,bt − V L,l,at ≥ Ω
(
Rcoupon,at −Rcoupon,biasedt
)
V L,l,bt
⇔
(
Rcoupon,at −Rcoupon,biasedt
)
BIL,lt ≥ Ω
(
Rcoupon,at −Rcoupon,biasedt
)
V L,l,bt
⇔ BIL,lt ≥ ΩV L,l,bt
⇔ Ω ≤ BI
L,l
t
V L,l,bt
.
Given the calibration in table 1, in the steady state it results that
Ω ≤ BI
L,l
V L,l,b
=
K¯L,l − nL,l
(rk,L − δ −Rcoupon,biased) K¯L,l + (1 +Rcoupon,biased)nL,l = 0.25 = Ω¯ .
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Table 1: Model parameters (time unit of model: quarterly)
Households Value Source Description
β 0.9875 our calibration discount factor
ψL (36) (endogenous) weight on disutility of labor
σL 1 CMR curvature of disutility of labor
b 0.63 CMR habit persistence in consumption
ξw 0.75 Erceg et al. (2000) fraction of households that cannot reoptimize wage
λw 1.05 CMR markup, workers
ιw1 0.29 CMR weight of wage indexation to steady state inﬂation
Firms
α 0.36 Levin et al. (2005) capital share in the production function
ξp 0.75 Erceg et al. (2000) fraction of ﬁrms that cannot reoptimize price
ι1 0.16 CMR weight of price indexation to steady state inﬂation
λf 1.2 CMR markup, intermediate good ﬁrms
S
′′
29.3 CMR curvature of investment adjustment cost function
δ 0.03 CMR depreciation rate on capital
ρ 0.6 our calibration degree of substitutability between capital services
Entrepreneurs
σHa , σ
L
a 18.9 CMR curvature of capital utilization cost functions
µ 0.15 our calibration fraction of realized proﬁts lost in bankruptcy
σH
√
0.3 our calibration standard deviation of productivity shock
ωe,H,r, ωe,L,l 0.02 CMR transfer from households
γL 0.96 our calibration survival probability of safer entrepreneurs
γH 0.97 our calibration survival probability of riskier entrepreneurs
η 0.3 our calibration share of riskier entrepreneurs
Ω 0.1 our calibration percentage of equity paid as side payments
Bond Market
εcoupon,a 510 Chen et al. (2007) interest rate elasticity of the demand for funds
ρx 0.9 our calibration degree of persistence in optimism
α3 40 our calibration sensitivity of optimism to entrepreneur's net worth
χ¯ 0 our calibration steady state level of optimism
Policy
ρ˜ 0.88 CMR interest rate smoothing
αpi 1.82 CMR weight of expected inﬂation in Taylor rule
αy 0.11 CMR weight of output gap in Taylor rule
ηg 0.2 CMR share of government consumption
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Table 2: Steady State Properties, Model versus U.S. Data
Variable Model U.S. data
K/Y 5.48 10.7
C/Y 0.63 0.56
I/Y 0.17 0.25
G/Y 0.2 0.2
leverage ratio = QK¯/N 1
safer 1.26
riskier 1.35
[1.21 ; 1.77]
bond to bank ﬁnance ratio 2 1.36 1.34
When not speciﬁed, the source for U.S. data is CMR and the sample period is 1998Q4-2003Q4. 1 CMR compute
the leverage as N/(QK¯ −N). We compute the leverage as in Bernanke et al. (1999). 2 Source: De Fiore and
Uhlig (2005).
Table 3: Interest Rates, Model versus U.S. Data
Variable Model U.S. data
Rate of return on capital, Rk
safer 11.38 %
riskier 8.40 %
10.32 %
Cost of external ﬁnance, Z 6.81 % [7.1 ; 8.1] %
Time deposit, Re 5.16 % 5.12 %
Cost of bond ﬁnance, Rcoupon 5.99 % 5.96 % 1
When not speciﬁed, the source for U.S. data is CMR and the sample period is 1987Q1-2003Q4. 1 Chen et al.
(2007) ﬁnd an average yield spread of AAA bonds over the period 1995-2003 of 84 basis points. Adding this
spread to the risk-free rate (Re) gives the value displayed in the table.
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